The Vaguer Sanctions of Conscience: A Constitutional and Policy Analysis of Nebraska Medical Tort Reform 1976–1987 by Newkirk, David G.
Nebraska Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 2 Article 5
1988
The Vaguer Sanctions of Conscience: A
Constitutional and Policy Analysis of Nebraska
Medical Tort Reform 1976–1987
David G. Newkirk
University of Nebraska College of Law, david_newkirk@swissre.com
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law, College of at DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Nebraska Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@University of Nebraska - Lincoln.
Recommended Citation
David G. Newkirk, The Vaguer Sanctions of Conscience: A Constitutional and Policy Analysis of Nebraska Medical Tort Reform 1976–1987,
67 Neb. L. Rev. (1988)
Available at: https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/nlr/vol67/iss2/5
Comment
The Vaguer Sanctions of Conscience:
A Constitutional and Policy
Analysis of Nebraska Medical Tort
Reform 1976-1987
TABLE OF CONTENTS
I. Introduction ............................................... 338
II. The Legislation ............................................ 340
A. Legislative Purposes, Goals, and Findings ............ 340
B. Persons Affected by the 1976 Legislation ............. 341
C. Absolute Limits on Damages ......................... 342
D. Collateral Source Modification ........................ 342
E. Statute of Limitations Modification ................... 343
F. Joint and Several Liability Modification .............. 345
G. Mandatory Pre-Trial Screening ....................... 346
III. Constitutional Analysis .................................... 347
A. Special Laws .......................................... 347
1. Historical Background ............................. 347
2. Taylor, Prendergast, and Edmunds ................ 351
3. Analysis ........................................... 352
B. Open Courts .......................................... 355
1. Historical Background ............................. 355
2. Prendergast and Colton ............................ 360
3. Analysis ........................................... 362
C. Federal Equal Protection and Due Process Analysis.. 365
1. Traditional Equal Protection Tests ................ 365
2. Traditional Due Process Tests ..................... 369
3. Duke Power and the White Dictum ............... 370
4. Heightened Scrutiny and Medical Tort Reform ... 372
5. Nebraska Anmalysis ................................. 375
IV. Policy Analysis ............................................ 377
V. Conclusion ................................................. 382
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
I. INTRODUCTION
An inherent strength of democracy is that an elected legislature is
rapidly sensitive to changes in the mood of the electorate. Yesterday's
burning issue is tomorrow's forgotten topic. Last year's evil is next
year's virtue. Paradoxically, this strength is also a weakness. The in-
stinct that balances the scales of justice ultimately is little different
from that which animates the rope-bearing mob.
Holmes' bad man' is aware of legislative responsiveness. He per-
verts it to his gain. The open door of the concerned representative is
filled by the lobbyist. Paid advertisements fill the free press. The fire
soon sweeps through the electorate and something must be done. Mo-
tivated by the best of intentions, the legislature becomes the disgrun-
tled purchaser of a manufactured crisis. The electors themselves are
the final victims.
The crisis is tort reform. The legislature is our own. Beginning in
the 1970s, insurers on both coasts and later, nationwide, sharply in-
creased premiums for certain lines of insurance. The initial manifes-
tation was felt in medical malpractice insurance. The impact on
physicians was real and their concern justified. Premiums in this line
almost doubled from 1974 to 1977.2 For purposes of later discussions,
the reader should note that these were late- and post-Vietnam years of
poor investment return, and that a temporary abatement in the "cri-
sis" followed with the high inflation years of the late 1970s and early
'80s.
A massive insurance industry campaign pointed to the legal sys-
tem, not the medical industry or the insurance industry itself, as the
source of the problem. The majority of jurisdictions took action to
correct the perceived problem. Nebraska responded in 1976 with com-
prehensive legislation that placed conditions on access to courts by
most medical malpractice claimants, 3 limited the absolute amount of
damages recoverable,4 and created various state primary and excess
1. If you want to know the law and nothing else, you must look at it as a
bad man, who cares only for the material consequences which such
knowledge enables him to predict, not as a good one, who finds his rea-
sons for conduct, whether inside the law or outside of it, in the vaguer
sanctions of conscience.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REv. 457, 459 (1897).
2. Sloan, State Responses to the Malpractice Insurance Crisis of the 1970s: An Em-
pirical Assessment, 9 J. HEALTH POL. POL'Y & LAw 629 (1985).
3. The Nebraska Hospital-Medical Liability Act, L.B. 434, § 40, 79th Leg., 1st Sess.,
1976 Neb. Laws 151 (codified as amended at NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2801 to -2855
(1984)) created a medical review panel as a precondition to bringing suit.
Although the system purportedly was elective, the predictable reality was that
most patients remained blissfully unaware of the consequences of their "elec-
tion." See NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2821(2) (1984) (prior to 1984 amendment).
4. L.B. 434, § 32(2), 79th Leg., 1st Sess., 1976 Neb. Laws 160 (codified at NEB. REV.
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risk underwriting associations. 5
Yet this was not enough. The Reagan presidency brought massive
deficit spending and surface prosperity, causing interest rates to fall.
A new crisis was born, fueled by a $6.5 million insurance industry
campaign and record industry investment profits. The lawyers were
driving doctors, school sports, and municipal services out of business,
even the clergy was feeling the pinch.6 Something had to be done.
The industry conveniently offered L.B. 425 as a solution. This bill
was considerably more far reaching than the 1976 legislation. An ab-
solute limit was proposed on all noneconomic damages, 7 the collateral
source rule was to be abolished,8 and joint and several liability was to
be replaced with several liability.9
Fortunately, the bill was rejected. However, the rejection was
close and the controversy is likely to be repeated. More importantly,
the majority of the 1976 legislation remains in place and the justifica-
tion for its passage has long since passed.
This comment examines the 1976 legislation and the proposed 1987
legislation from a constitutional and a policy base. Part II discusses the
legislation itself. Part III discusses questions that are raised under the
state and federal constitutions. Finally, Part IV discusses the insur-
ance industry in Nebraska to determine whether a true crisis exists.
Some aspects of L.B. 425 reach far beyond medical tort reform and
STAT. § 44-2825(1) (1984)), limited total recovery to $500,000, regardless of the se-
riousness of injury, for patients who had "elected" to be bound by the Act.
5. L.B. 434, § 29,79th Leg., 1st Sess., 1976 Neb. Laws 158 (codified at NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 44-2829 (1984)), created the excess liability fund, a carrier for malpractice cover-
age in excess of $100,000. In addition, § 37(2), 1976 Neb. Laws 164 (codified at
NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2837 (1984)), created the Residual Malpractice Authority.
The authority was authorized to write primary coverage should commercial cov-
erage become unavailable for any class of health care providers.
6. The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REP. 544, 545 (1986), shows four of the
full-page ads issued by the Insurance Information Institute, a $6.5 million insurer-
funded entity. The ads are headlined, respectively-"EVEN THE CLERGY
CAN'T ESCAPE THE LAWSUIT CRISIS," illustrated with a frowning clergy-
man; "INSURANCE IS GETTING KILLED IN SELF-DEFENSE," illustrated
with an intent jury;, 'THE LAWSUIT CRISIS IS BAD FOR BABIES," illustrated
with a newborn in a physician's hand; and "THE LAWSUIT CRISIS IS PENAL-
IZING SCHOOL SPORTS," illustrated with a young football player whose head
is lowered. All end with the statement, "The Lawsuit Crisis. We all pay the
price." The $6.5 million added to the price by the campaign is not mentioned.
7. L.B. 425, § 27, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987) would have placed an absolute limit of
$250,000 on all noneconomic damages in all civil actions.
8. L.B. 425, § 12, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987) required the trier of fact to consider not
only existing collateral payments, but payments "which are substantially certain
to be paid."
9. L.B. 425, § 32, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987). Each tortfeasor would have been as-
signed liability on a percentage basis. The operation would have shifted the loss
from insolvent tortfeasors to the plaintiff, rather than to co-defendants as under
present law.
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into unrelated areas, such as corporate director and municipal liabil-
ity. These areas are generally beyond the scope of this comment.
However, many of these reforms involve the same modifications in
tort law. The constitutional and policy arguments share a common
base and the comment may be instructive for the reader concerned
with these areas.
II. THE LEGISLATION
A. Legislative Purposes, Goals, and Findings
The 1976 legislation expressed concern with the cost, quality and
availability of health care, and the availability of malpractice insur-
ance. One goal was the establishment of "prompt and efficient meth-
ods for eliminating the expense as well as the useless expenditure of
time of physicians and courts in nonmeritorious claims and for effi-
ciently resolving meritorious claims."1 0
The 1976 Legislature also expressed its intent to provide an alter-
nate means of dispute resolution. The intent was backed by a poorly
worded finding that "too large a percentage of the cost of malpractice
insurance is received by individuals other than the injured party.""1
Thus, a dispute resolution system was provided to "improve the availa-
bility of medical care, improve its quality, and to reduce the cost
thereof, and to insure the availability of malpractice insurance cover-
age at reasonable rates."1 2
The 1987 legislation had multiple purposes. The bill began with a
finding and declaration that "in order to assure the just distribution of
the cost and risk of injury and to fairly assign fault to deter future
injury, an equitable civil litigation process must be preserved."13
Second, L.B. 425 continued with a finding of relevance to medical
torts. "The threat of excessive litigation and awards discourages phy-
sicians and other health providers from initiating or continuing their
practices or offering needed services to the public and contributes to
the rising costs and limitations of consumer health care."14
Finally, the Legislature declared that its intent was "to protect and
preserve a fair, equitable, and responsible civil litigation process for all
parties to assure the availability of adequate and appropriate compen-
sation for persons injured through the fault of others."1 5
10. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2801(1) (1984).
11. I Presumably, the legislature meant that too large a percentage of benefits paid
pursuant to malpractice insurance policies are received by individuals other than
the injured party. The cost of insurance is paid by the insured and received by
the insurer.
12. Id.
13. L.B. 425, § 1(1), 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987).
14. IH § 1(4).
15. I § 1(5).
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B. Persons Affected by the 1976 Legislation
The 1976 legislation affected two classes-health care providers
and patients. A health care provider was defined as a physician or
nurse anesthetist1 6 who was licensed to practice in Nebraska,17
whether individually or in corporate form.' 8 Hospitals also were pro-
tected.19 Podiatrists, chiropractors, dentists, optometrists, osteopaths,
pharmacists, audiologists, psychologists, and marriage or family coun-
selors are excluded.20
The second qualification for protection under the Act was proof of
insurance. A health care provider must obtain malpractice insurance
coverage of $100,000 per occurrence and $300,000 per year aggregate
liability. For hospitals, the requirement is $1 million dollars per year.
Proof of such insurance must be filed with the Nebraska Director of
Insurance.21 Finally, the provider must participate in a state-spon-
sored excess coverage program.22
The final requirement for a provider to qualify for the protection
of the Act was a notice requirement. The provider was required to
post, in the waiting room or other "suitable location" that "[name of
provider] has qualified under the provisions of the Nebraska Hospital-
Medical Liability Act. Patients will be subject to the terms and provi-
sions of that Act unless they file a refusal to be bound by the Act with
the Director of Insurance of the State of Nebraska."2 3 Under regula-
tions promulgated by the State Department of Insurance, the notice is
to be eight and one-half inches by eleven inches.24 Although the Act
is identified by title, legislative bill (L.B.) number, and legislature, fur-
ther identification is expressly optional.25
A patient is defined as a natural person who "receives or should
have received health care from a licensed health care provider"26
16. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2803(1)(a), (b) (1984).
17. Id § 44-2803(2).
18. Id. § 44-2803(1)(d).
19. Id.
20. Id § 44-2804 (limiting physician to "a person with an unlimited license to practice
medicine in this state pursuant to sections 71-1,102 to 71-1,107.14"). Each of the
excluded professions is regulated under other sections of chapter 71. Finally, the
provider must participate in a state-sponsored excess coverage program.
21. Id. § 44-2824(1)(a) (1984). The 1986 legislation changed this to $200,000 per occur-
rence. Id. § 44-2824(1)(a) (Supp. 1987).
22. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
23. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2821(4) (1984); NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. tit. 210, ch. 32, 005-
007 (1985).
24. NEB&. ADmN. R. & REGs. tit. 210, ch. 32, 005-007 (1985).
25. Id. The regulations also provide a sample sign that states the patient must "notify
the... health care provider of the election as soon as is reasonable under the
circumstances that such patient has so elected." Id
26. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2805 (1984).
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under an express or implied contract.27 A patient may opt out of the
Act by filing a notice of refusal to be bound with the State Director of
Insurance and notifying the health care provider "as soon as is reason-
able under the circumstances." 28 The election requires renewal every
two years to remain in effect.29
In 1986, the amount of insurance required for non-hospital provid-
ers to qualify was modified. Such a provider now is required to carry
$200,000 per occurrence and $600,000 per year aggregate coverage.3 0
C. Absolute Limits on Damages
The 1976 legislation created an absolute limit of $500,000 on recov-
ery of damages for parties under the Act.3 ' The provider was liable
only for the first $100,000, with the balance to be paid out of the Ne-
braska Excess Liability Fund.32 The 1984 revision raised the maxi-
mum amount recoverable to $1 million for claims after December 31,
1984.33
L.B. 425 would have added an absolute limit of $250,000 for
noneconomic damages awarded to a single plaintiff, regardless of the
number of defendants.3 4 Noneconomic damages were defined as "sub-
jective, nonmonetary losses, including, but not limited to, pain, suffer-
ing, inconvenience, mental anguish and suffering, emotional distress,
loss of society and companionship, loss of consortium, injury to reputa-
tion, humiliation, fear of loss, illness, or injury, and the impairment of
the quality of life."35 The limitation was not to be disclosed to the
jury,3 6 although the jury would have been required to make a separate
finding on the amount of noneconomic damages.3 7 Finally, the
$250,000 limit was subject to all other limitations, such as the $1 mil-
lion limit on awards under the existing Hospital-Medical Liability Act.
D. Collateral Source Modification
Both the 1976 and the proposed 1987 legislation contained modifi-
cations of the collateral source rule.38 The 1976 legislation contained a
27. Id Since 1963, Nebraska has barred recovery for negligence if the care was ren-
dered in good faith on an emergency or rescue basis by a member of a volunteer
fire department, first aid, or emergency squad. Id § 35-108.
28. Id. § 44-2821(2).
29. Id. § 44-2821(3).
30. Id § 44-2824(1)(a) (Supp. 1987).
31. Id- § 44-2825(1) (1984)(prior to 1984 amendment).
32. See infra notes 58-64 and accompanying text.
33. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2825(1) (1984).
34. L.B. 425, § 27, 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987).
35. I& § 26(2).
36. I& § 29.
37. Id. § 28.
38. The collateral source rule provides that a tortfeasor is liable for all damages prox-
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very limited modification of the rule. When an element of damages
was the cost of medical care, custodial care, or rehabilitation services,
a deduction from the final verdict was allowed in the amount of pay-
ments made by any nonrefundable medical insurance, less the amount
of premiums paid for the insurance.3 9 Nonrefundable benefits were
"those payments not required to be refunded in event of recovery of
damages." 40 Thus no deduction was required, if the recovery was sub-
rogated to the insurance carrier. Further, even if a deduction was
called for, the amount was inadmissible and was not to be brought to
the attention of the jury. The parties could either stipulate to the
amounts deducted or have this figure determined by the court.41
By contrast, L.B. 425 attempted to completely abrogate the collat-
eral source rule:
[]n all civil actions, regardless of the theory of liability under which they are
brought, the court shall allow the admission into evidence of proof of collat-
eral source payments which have already been made or which are substan-
tially certain to be made to the claimant.... Proof of such payments shall be
considered by the trier of fact in arriving at the amount of any award and shall
be considered by the court in reviewing awards made for excessiveness.42
Further, L.B. 425 specifically provided: "Nothing... shall interfere
with any right of subrogation nor shall it preclude the collection of the
same from any defendant."43 The only protection offered to plaintiffs
was that the trier of fact was again allowed to hear and consider evi-
dence of insurance premiums paid by the plaintiff.44
E. Statute of Limitations Modification
The 1976 legislation provided a two-year statute of limitation for
actions under the Act.45 However, the Act also provided a discovery
rule. Consistent with judicial adoption of the discovery rule in Spath
v. Morrow,46 the Act provided that, if the malpractice "is not discov-
ered and could not be discovered within such two-year period, the ac-
tion may be commenced within one year from the date of the
imately caused by the tort, and may not claim a reduction in liability for the tort
because the plaintiff was able to recover part of the loss from outside sources.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920A (1979).
If abrogation of the rule is applied in a non-discriminatory manner, and
double deductions by subrogated sources prevented, there would seem to be few
problems with its elimination. The Restatement itself notes that "the rule is of
common law origin and can be changed by statute." Id. comment d.
39. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2819(1) (1984).
40. I- § 44-2817.
41. Id § 44-2819(1).
42. L.B. 425, § 12(1), 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987).
43. I
44. 1& § 12(3).
45. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2828 (1984).
46. 174 Neb. 38, 115 N.W.2d 581 (1962).
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discovery or the discovery of facts which would reasonably lead to
such discovery, whichever is earlier."47 Finally, the Act provided that
"[iln no event may any action be commenced to recover damages for
malpractice or professional negligence.., more than six years after
the date [of the malpractice]." 48
The interpretation of the six-year limit was affected by Sacchi v.
Blodig.49 Sacchi was an action for malpractice that occurred in 1967
and 1968, well before the commencement of the Act. The plaintiff was
under a disability until 1979 and filed suit in 1980.50 The court held an
identically worded ten-year bar for malpractice outside of the Act was
a limit on the time the statute would be tolled for discovery and not an
absolute limit of time to bring the action.51 Thus, those not under a
disability were barred after ten years, regardless of whether or not
they had discovered the injury. Those under a disability had the stat-
ute tolled for the entire time of their disability, even if the disability
lasted more than ten years.
Drafters of the 1984 revisions obtained a State Attorney General's
Opinion that the six-year limitation under the Act also would not op-
erate to bar claims by those under disabilities. The opinion further
stated that the six-year limit under the Act might raise equal protec-
tion questions, when compared to the ten-year limit outside of the
Act.52 Thus, the drafters expanded the period to ten years under the
Act, as well.53
A last feature of the 1976 legislation was that the filing of a request
for review tolled "the applicable statute of limitations for a period of
90 days following the issuance of the opinion by the medical review
panel."54 In Jacobs v. Goetowski,5 5 the court held the ninety days was
added to the two-year limit. A contrary construction, which would
have required suit within ninety days from the issuance of the opinion,
was rejected over a dissent.56
L.B. 425 would have attempted to overrule the Sacchi holding.
First, the knowledge of a custodial parent or guardian would have
been imputed to a minor or an insane person and commenced the run-
ning of the statute. Second, the ten-year limitation period specifically
was made applicable to all persons, regardless of minority or other
47. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (1984).
48. Id (prior to 1984 amendment).
49. 215 Neb. 817, 341 N.W.2d 326 (1983).
50. Id at 818, 341 N.W.2d at 328.
51. Id at 822-24, 341 N.W.2d at 330-31.
52. 1983-84 Op. Neb. Att'y Gen. 199 (1983).
53. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2828 (1984).
54. Id. § 44-2844.
55. 221 Neb. 281, 376 N.W.2d 773 (1985).
56. Id at 293, 376 N.W.2d at 780 (Krivosha, C.J., dissenting).
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disability.S7
F. Joint and Several Liability Modffication
The 1976 legislation modified traditional joint and several liability
by shifting all losses in excess of $100,000 to the Nebraska Excess Lia-
bility Fund, which was established by a surcharge on qualified provid-
ers. The surcharge could not exceed the lesser of fifty percent of the
provider's premium for the first $100,000 or the amount necessary to
maintain the fund at approximately $5 million.58
The fund was a mandatory participant in all cases in which settle-
ment offers of $100,000 were rejected by the plaintiff. To involve the
fund, the plaintiff was required to file a petition describing the
amounts sought from the fund in the court with jurisdiction. If juris-
diction had not been established yet, the petition was to be filed in a
state district court.59 Copies of the petition were to be served on the
Director of Insurance, the health care provider, and the health care
provider's insurer, all of whom were given rights to intervene. 60 If no
settlement could be reached, all of the parties would present evidence
to the judge, who would determine the amount of the claimant's dam-
ages in excess of $100,000. A jury trial apparently was not
contemplated. 61
The 1984 revisions made clear that plaintiff's damages were an is-
sue to be determined at trial.62 A final change made by the 1984 revi-
sions dealt with the reserve level of the Excess Liability Fund. Rather
than a stipulated level, the fund was to be maintained at "a level
which is sufficient to pay all anticipated claims for the next year and
maintain an adequate reserve for future claims."63
The 1986 legislation raised the amount necessary to trigger the
Fund's mandatory participation to $200,000.64 This is consistent with
changing the amount of insurance required to be carried by qualified
providers to $200,000.
The 1976 legislation also codified one portion of traditional joint
and several liability. The RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS provides
that an advance payment made by a defendant is credited against his
57. L.B. 425, 90th Leg., 1st Sess., § 15 (1987). Parts of Sacchi may have been effec-
tively overruled by Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982), which
held that no awareness of injury was required to commence the running of the
statute.
58. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2829(2) (1984). The amount reserved was specified as ap-
proximately $5 million. Id. § 44-2830 (prior to 1984 amendment).
59. Id § 44-2833(1)-(2) (prior to 1984 amendment).
60. I& § 44-2833(3).
61. L.B. 434, § 33(6)-(7), 79th Leg., 1st Sess., 1976 NEB. LAWS 151.
62. NEB. REv. STAT. § 44-2823(6) (1984).
63. Id § 44-2830.
64. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2832 (Supp. 1986).
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overall liability.65 The 1976 legislation codified this: "[T]he advance
payment shall inure to the exclusive benefit of the defendant making
the payment."66
In contrast, L.B. 425 attempted to repeal joint and several liability.
"Each defendant shall be liable only for the amount of damages allo-
cated to that defendant in direct proportion to that defendant's per-
centage of fault, and a separate judgment shall be rendered against the
defendant for that amount."6 7 In addition, the language incorporating
traditional joint and several tort liability was deleted.68
The apportionment of fault also could include nonparties, if notice
was given 120 days prior to trial. If the nonparty settled prior to trial,
fault could be assessed "regardless of whether such person was or
could have been named as a party to the suit either as a defendant or
plaintiff." 69 Findings of fault against nonparties would not amount to
a finding of liability and were not admissible in any other action.7 0
Joint liability would have been preserved in limited cases under
L.B. 425. For example, joint liability could be imposed on those "who
consciously and deliberately pursue a common plan or design to com-
mit a tortious act or actively take part in it."71
G. Mandatory Pre-Trial Screening
The 1976 legislation established screening by a medical review
panel as an absolute precondition to the commencement of a malprac-
tice action against any covered provider.72 The procedure raised a
number of constitutional issues and was upheld in Prendergast v Nel-
son.73 While a number of issues were not addressed by Prendergast,
the procedure became voluntary in 1984 and is not discussed in detail
here.74
65. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 920(A)(1) (1979).
66. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2826(2) (1984).
67. L.B. 425, § 32, 90th Leg., 1st. Sess. (1987).
68. Id. § 17.
69. Id. § 33.
70. Id. § 34.
71. Id. § 35. Similar, though less harsh modifications have been reintroduced in the
current Legislature. L.B. 1178, § 3, 90th Leg., 2nd Sess. (1987), provides that "in
all civil actions... the liability of each party for damages shall be several only and
shall not be joint." The bill then softens this modification by exempting concert
of action and multiple manufacturers in the chain of manufacture of a product.
Finally, the bill allows for reallocation of one defendant's share to the other de-
fendant's should the first defendant's share prove uncollectible. Id, § 5.
72. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840(2) (1984)(prior to 1984 amendment).
73. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
74. NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2840(4) (1984). The procedure remains a trap for the un-
wary, since waiver must be exercised by serving the State Director of Insurance
with a copy of the petition. Id.
An example of a severe constitutional problem not addressed by Prendergast
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III. CONSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS
A. Special Laws
1. Historical Background
The Nebraska Constitution contains a provision that forbids the
passage of local or special laws. The provision, enacted with the rest of
the current constitution in 1875, provides that "[t]he legislature shall
not pass local or special laws in any of the following cases" 75 and con-
tinues with a long list of forbidden actions, such as the granting of a
divorce, the changing of individuals' names, the empaneling of grand
juries, changing the law of descent, and granting charters to railroad
companies. After the list of individual subjects, the section concludes
by saying, "[i]n all other cases where a general law can be made appli-
cable, no special law shall be enacted."76
The section raises several issues. First, it could be argued that the
placement of a $1 million limit on damages and limited collateral
source reform under the Nebraska Medical-Hospital Liability Act is
legislation in favor of a class, when general legislation could be made
applicable. Qualified providers can be viewed as a narrow class who
are entitled to the limitation of damages, while other similar profes-
sionals, such as psychologists, are not. The class also could be viewed
more broadly as including only victims of medical tortfeasors and ex-
cluding victims of other tortfeasors.
A second question is presented by L.B. 425. It could be argued that
two classes are created. Those with less than $250,000 of noneconomic
damages may recover these damages in full. Those with damages in
excess of the statutory figure may not. A similar question is raised by
the $1 million limit of the Medical-Hospital Liability Act.
In order to fully understand the current Nebraska Supreme Court
interpretation of section 18, it is necessary to review the historical case
law from which such interpretation evolved. An early case provides
concerns differential treatment of hospital defendants. In any review involving a
hospital, the hospital was entitled to select an additional voting member. Id. § 44-
2841(2)(b). This raised the size of the panel to four and guaranteed the defend-
ants' selection of two panelists, while the plaintiff would select only one. I& § 44-
2841(1).
An additional fact not available to the Prendergast court is that it is now clear
that the panels functioned to reduce damages awarded to the plaintiff. This is
seen by analysis of the payment of claims in excess of $100,000 from the Nebraska
Excess Liability Fund. Prior to 1984, when the panels became voluntary, no
claims in excess of $100,000 were paid from the fund. In 1984 six claims were
paid; in 1985, four;, in 1986, nine; and none in the first quarter of 1987. Memoran-
dum of Author's Interview with Mabel Smith, Administrator of State Medical-
Hospital Liability, Nebraska Department of Insurance, July 16, 1987, at 1 [herein-
after Interview].
75. NEB. CoNST. art. III, § 18.
76. IA
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explicit guidance on exactly what was meant by general and special
laws. The 1875 Legislature enacted two laws authorizing school dis-
tricts to issue bonds. The first authorized the board of trustees of Falls
City School District 56 to issue bonds up to the amount of $20,000.77
The second authorized district officers of any school district to issue
bonds, the amount being regulated by the number of students.78
District 56 issued a bond and subsequently defaulted. In Clegg v.
School District No. 56,79 a bondholder sued to collect and the District
set up the unconstitutionality of the enabling statute as a defense. The
court held the statute for District 56 was unconstitutional, stating, "[lt
cannot be doubted that the act in question is a special act. It relates
exclusively to school district No. 56, in Richardson county [sic]. None
of its provisions apply, or are intended to apply to any other subdivi-
sion of the state, or the people thereof."8 0
The court remanded to determine whether issuance of the bond
was authorized under "either of the two general acts,"81 referring to
the second bill. From Clegg, it is clear an act may not run in favor of
specific persons or entities.8 2
In the decade following Clegg, the court decided two cases, State ex
rel. Jones v. Graham8 3 and State ex rel. Selden v. Berka,8 4 which pro-
vide further insight into the interpretation of section 18. In both cases,
the court considered and rejected constitutional challenges to legisla-
tion aimed exclusively at cities of specific classes.8 5
The key factor underlying the decisions in Graham and Berka ap-
pears to have been the open-ended nature of the classification created
by the legislation.8 6 Each case involved a class of cities fixed in rela-
77. Act of Feb. 2, 1875, 1875 Neb. Laws 280.
78. Act of Feb. 25, 1875, 1875 Neb. Laws 118.
79. 8 Neb. 178 (1879).
80. Id at 179.
81. Id- at 180.
82. The distinction between a special and general law is further clarified in City of
Wahoo v. Dickinson, 23 Neb. 426, 36 N.W. 813 (1888), in which it is stated: "Our
constitution prohibits special legislation as applied to any particular municipal
corporation. The Legislature, therefore, cannot, by special act, extend the bound-
aries of any city or town. This must, therefore, be done by general law... under
which some contiguous territory may be attached to such city or town." Id at 430,
36 N.W. at 816.
83. 16 Neb. 74, 19 N.W. 470 (1889)(upholding legislation according powers to second
class cities only, of which Lincoln was the only one at the time).
84. 20 Neb. 375, 30 N.W. 267 (1886)(change in organic laws of first class cities only
upheld).
85. See State ex reL Jones v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74, 77, 19 N.W. 470, 471-472 (1889); State
ex reL Selden v. Berka, 20 Neb. 375, 378-379, 30 N.W. 267, 269 (1886). Berka in-
volved changes in the organic laws of first-class cities; Graham involved changes
in the organic laws of second-class cities.
86. See State ex rel. Jones v. Graham, 16 Neb. 74, 77, 19 N.W. 470,471-472 (1889); State
ex rel Selden v. Berka, 20 Neb. 375, 378-379, 30 N.W. 267, 269 (1886).
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tion to the object of the legislation. As a city changed size, the needs
of its municipal government changed. The legislation in both cases
recognized that a change in circumstance might involve a change in
class. The Berka court stressed that the creation of a class was not
objectionable as long as something distinguished the class:
Upon this point it seems to be settled that if a law is general and uniform
throughout the state, operating alike upon all persons and localities of a class,
or who are brought within the relations and circumstances provided for, it is
not objectionable as wanting in uniformity of operation.8 7
Other cases clearly demonstrate that a law may be special because
it defines a class which is underinclusive in relation to its purpose. In
Althaus v. State,88 the Legislature specified one rate of interest for
most loans, but set a lower rate for loans using certain listed chattels
as collateral. The court struck the legislation. "A lender who charges
extortionate interest and accepts security on the chattels enumerated
by the legislature may be punished. Another lender who makes a loan
on identical terms, except that he includes.., an article not enumer-
ated in the act... goes free."8 9 For purposes of the Nebraska Medical-
Hospital Liability Act, the relevant question is why professionals enu-
merated in the Act are protected while others, who may undertake
identical acts, are not. Other cases, such as Low v. Rees Printing Co.,90
test the legislative purpose against the means chosen to effectuate that
purpose.91
By the turn of the twentieth century, the court's test of comparing
legislative purpose and means, for determining whether legislation
constituted a special law, was phrased in terms sounding remarkably
like the modern standard of intermediate scrutiny under an equal pro-
tection analysis. In State ex rel. Dawson County v. Farmers &
Merchants Irrigation Co.,92 the court stated:
87. State ex reL Selden v. Berka, 20 Neb. 375, 378-379, 30 N.W. 267, 269 (1886).
88. 94 Neb. 780, 144 N.W. 799 (1913).
89. Id. at 782,144 N.W. at 799. See also Foxworthy v. City of Hastings, 23 Neb. 772, 37
N.W. 657 (1888). Foxworthy struck a special statute of limitations for negligence
which applied only to municipal corporations. The case reasoned that negligence
was the same offense regardless of who the defendant was. Id. at 778, 37 N.W. at
660.
90. 41 Neb. 127, 59 N.W. 362 (1884).
91. Id at 136, 59 N.W. at 364. In Low, the court invalidated a law limiting working
hours to eight hours per day, but exempted farm and domestic labor. The court
relied on a test comparing legislative purpose and means in reaching its decision,
stating, "[t]he argument made in favor of necessity that each day the excess over
eight hours should be devoted to rest, recreation, and mental improvement loses
much of its force when these very desirable benefits are by the statute itself re-
stricted to certain defined classes of laborers." Id. See also Livingston Loan &
Building Ass'n v. Drummond, 49 Neb. 200, 205, 68 N.W. 375, 377 (1896)(the Legis-
lature "may not arbitrarily and without any possible reason create a class to be
affected by legislation").
92. 59 Neb. 1, 80 N.W. 52 (1899).
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'If these objects [of the law] are distinguished from others by characteristics
evincing a peculiar relation to the legislative purpose, and showing the legisla-
tion to be reasonably appropriate to the former and inappropriate to the lat-
ter, the objects will be considered ... to be a class by themselves .... But if the
characteristics used to distinguish the objects... are not germane to the legis-
lative purpose, or ... if objects with similar characteristics and like relation to
the legislative purpose have been excluded from the operation of the law, then
.. legislation is not general, but local, or special.'
9 3
Dawson County clearly indicates the significance of the "underinclu-
siveness" test in the special law equation.
Throughout the period from 1900 to 1976, the court almost unfail-
ingly applied purpose/means, or underinclusiveness testing in striking
down a wide variety of special legislation.9 4 For example, during this
time period, the court struck down the following: (1) legislation ex-
empting fire chiefs and assistant chiefs from labor regulations applica-
ble to all other firemen (purpose/means); 95 (2) legislation creating
differential pay increases for constitutionally defined classes of state
employees (purpose/means); 96 and (3) legislation providing a state
waiver of sovereign immunity solely in favor of one person
(underinclusiveness).97
Continental Insurance Co. v. Smrha98 provided the court with yet
another opportunity to fine-tune its special law analysis. In Smrha,
the court applied both purpose/means and underinclusiveness testing
93. Id. at 4, 80 N.W. at 53 (quoting Long Branch v. Sloan, 49 N.J.L. 356, 362-363, 8 A.
101, 104 (N.J. 1887)). On an almost identical set of facts, the court reaffirmed the
holding in 1934. County of Dawon v. Dawson County Irrigation B., 125 Neb. 836,
252 N.W. 320 (1934). See also Cleland v. Anderson, 66 Neb. 252, 92 N.W. 306
(1902)(validity of legislative classification depended on "reasons of public policy
and substantial differences of situation").
94. See, e.g., State ex rel. Rogers v. Swanson, 192 Neb. 125, 219 N.W.2d 726
(1974)(striking statute authorizing public grants for students to attend private in-
stitutions on purpose/means and underinclusiveness grounds; public grants to
private insitutions did not further the legislative purpose of aiding needy students
in obtaining a post-high school education and because students attending voca-
tional-type private institutions were ineligible for the public grants); Continental
Ins. Co. v. Smrha, 131 Neb. 791, 270 N.W. 122 (1936)(striking legislation that pro-
vided for tax on fire insurers for the purpose of improving firehouses, on underin-
clusiveness and purpose/means grounds, because legislation imposed burdens on
insurance company, but granted benefits to both insured and uninsured property
owners equally); State v. Scott, 97 Neb. 681, 97 N.W. 1021, on reh'g, 97 Neb. 685,
100 N.W. 812 (1904)(striking statute on underinclusivness grounds when the legis-
lation authorized county surveyors to act ex-officio as county engineers, but only
in towns with a population of more than 50,000 as of the 1900 census, effectively
limiting the class to Omaha and Lincoln).
95. State ex reL Rea v. Lincoln, 98 Neb. 634, 636, 154 N.W. 217, 219 (1915)("no good
reason" for classes created).
96. State ex reL Taylor v. Hall, 129 Neb. 669, 262 N.W. 835 (1935).
97. Cox v. State, 134 Neb. 751, 279 N.W. 482 (1938). In Cox, the court noted that "the
provisions of the Constitution of this state are mandatory." Id. at 756, 279 N.W. at
486.
98. 131 Neb. 791, 270 N.W. 122 (1936).
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in striking down legislation designed to improve firehouses by the im-
position of a tax solely on the class of fire insurers. Because the legis-
lative object, if achieved, would have conferred equal benefits on
owners of insured property and uninsured property alike, the court
reasoned "there is no actual difference between the two [classes] in
relation to the object to be accomplished." 99
Purpose/means testing continued as recently as 1974. In State ex
rel. Rogers v. Swanson,lOO the Legislature authorized public grants for
students to attend private institutions. The court held that the statute
created two invalid classes, students and institutions. "If the purpose
is to aid needy students in securing a post high-school education, the
classification is questionable .... The training in the private schools is
limited to the academic field. A student desiring to enter a private
institution specializing in a vocational type training is not eligible."01
2. Taylor, Prendergast, and Edmunds
This background brings us to two cases on point. In 1974, in re-
sponse to the insurance crisis, the Legislature passed a shortened two-
year statute of limitations for professional negligence.102 The statute
was attacked on a variety of constitutional grounds. However, in Tay-
lor v. Karrer, the court rejected the contention that the statute was a
special law:
There are substantial reasons for legislative discrimination in regard to this
field. We have seen in recent years the growth of malpractice litigation to the
point where numerous insurance companies have withdrawn from this field.
Insurance rates are practically prohibitive so that many professional people
must either remain unprotected or pass the insurance charges along .... Pub-
lic policy dictates diverse legislation in regard to professional services.1 0 3
It is noteworthy that the statute of limitations in Taylor applied to a
broad class. The statute, by its terms, applied to "professional mal-
practice." No attempt was made to delimit this to specific professions.
The second case is Prendergast v. Nelson.1 0 4 In Prendergast, a
three judge plurality upheld the constitutionality of the Medical-Hos-
pital Liability Act, including its $500,000 limitation. Although the is-
sue of special laws was raised by the appellants in their brief,105 the
majority did not address the contention apart from its equal protection
99. Id. at 794, 270 N.W. at 124.
100. 192 Neb. 125, 219 N.W.2d 726 (1974).
101. I& at 138, 219 N.W.2d at 734.
102. NEB. REV. STAT. § 25-222 (1985).
103. 196 Neb. 581, 586, 244 N.W.2d 201, 204 (1976). Appellant argued the statute was a
special law, but did not cite Foxworthy, a case striking a class statute of limita-
tions as special law. Brief for Appellant at 1, 56-58, Taylor v. Karrer, 196 Neb.
581, 244 N.W.2d 201 (1976)(Bound Volume 1402).
104. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
105. Brief for Appellant at 27-34, Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657
(1977)(Bound volume 1438).
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analysis. Three dissenters would have stricken large portions of the
Act. Justices White and McGowan relied on Wright v. Central
DuPage Hospital,106 an Illinois decision that struck down maximum
limits on recovery. The dissenters reasoned that the Act "arbitrarily
classified, and unreasonably discriminated against, the most seriously
injured victims of medical malpractice, but has not limited the recov-
ery of those victims who suffer moderate or minor injuries."107
Significantly, in the post-Prendergast case, State v. Edmunds,108
the court returned to purpose/means testing in striking down the Ne-
braska motor vehicle inspection law as a special law. The Edmund
court held the elimination of mopeds from the inspection act "was not
justified by any significant reduction in danger to the operator or
others by reason of faulty equipment as compared with other two-
wheeled vehicles not exempted."109  Again, the class was
underinclusive.
3. Analysis
The Nebraska Medical-Hospital Liability Act is unquestionably
special legislation that would have been stricken by early Nebraska
courts. The Act fails because it is underinclusive according to its own
purposes. Such underinclusiveness might be permissible under an
equal protection analysis. However, the prohibition against special
laws is a distinct constitutional restriction of state legislative power. A
court that applies equal protection analysis when the issue of special
laws is raised abrogates the constitutional responsibilities entrusted to
it by the 1875 framers of the Nebraska Constitution and ignores prece-
dent stretching back to that date.
Before further analysis, the threshold issue of election must be ad-
dressed. If the statute is in fact a voluntary choice, no party can be
heard to complain. Although the State Department of Insurance
claims the number of waivers is confidential, the Department admits
that only about one to twenty-five persons have exercised this waiver
in the ten years of the Act.llo The low number of "waivers" supports
a conclusion that few patients "elect" to proceed under the statute.
This conclusion is reinforced by the fact that, since medical malprac-
tice review panels became voluntary, the panels are requested by as
few as one in ten claimants.111
106. 63 Ill. 2d 313, 347 N.E.2d 736 (1976).
107. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 131, 256 N.W.2d 657, 676 (1977)(White, J., dis-
senting)(quoting Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp., 63 Ill. 2d 313, 325, 347 N.E.2d
736, 741 (1976)).
108. 211 Neb. 380, 318 N.W.2d 859 (1982).
109. Id. at 387, 318 N.W.2d at 862.
110. Interview, supra note 74.
ill. Id.
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The Prendergast dissenters, acting without information regarding
the low number of waivers, noted that "[t]he provisions in the dct in
regard to an election by a claimant are unrealistic and illusory."112
One of the dissenters went even further, stating.
[The reality of the freedom to elect by a claimant was not considered and is
not easily demonstrable. Such an election provision ignores the inequality of
bargaining power. The very nature of a person's status as a patient places him
in a position which makes effective bargaining difficult. A right to elect not to
be covered, from which might result a denial of service from the only hospital
or physician in a geographical area, can hardly be said to be without implicit
coercion.11 3
The election is questionable for another reason as well. The only
notice patients receive of their opportunity to elect is an eight and one-
half by eleven inch sign that identifies the Act by name and L.B.
number, and states that a failure to elect will result in the patients
being bound by the terms of the Act "unless they file a refusal to be
... bound with the Director of Insurance of the State of Nebraska."
The sign is small and may be overlooked. Most patients would have
no idea of how to exercise their election without consulting an attor-
ney. The sign does not mention the limitation on damages or the
existence of review panels. 114 If the party even realizes the existence
of a choice, the choice is made without knowledge of the rights given
up or the duties imposed. This violates the standard of knowledge of
rights and voluntary waiver set forth in State ex rel. Schaub v. City of
Scottsbluff 11
The statute operates to create three classes. First, there are quali-
fied physicians, nurse anesthetists, and hospitals and their agents.
Second, there are unqualified physicians, nurse anesthetists, and hos-
pitals and their agents. Finally, there are psychologists, non-anesthe-
tist nurses, psychologists, dentists, osteopaths, chiropractors,
pharmacists, optometrists and their employees, as well as other pro-
fessionals. Only the first class is accorded protection.
The first argument that the Act constitutes special legislation is
based on the fact that certain professionals can never qualify for its
protection. By way of comparison, consider the statute of limitations
112. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 133, 256 N.W.2d 657, 677 (1977)(Boslaugh, J.,
dissenting).
113. Id at 132, 256 N.W.2d at 676-77 (White, J., dissenting). Justice White's observa-
tion finds support in the facts of the notorious Hahn case. Hahn was a Kearney
resident who opted out of the Act and found that care became unavailable. "Mr.
Hahn and his wife checked with every doctor in their area.... They went to the
hospitals. They went to clinics. They tried every medical professional in their
area plus some to try to get treatment and were refused." Floor Debate of L.B.
692, 88th Leg., 2nd Sess. 8452 (statement of Sen. Kilgarin).
114. NEB. ADMIN. R. & REGS. tit. 210, ch. 32, 005-007 (1985). See supra notes 24-26 and
accompanying text.
115. 169 Neb. 525, 530, 100 N.W.2d 202, 206 (1960).
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approved in Taylor."16 The statute, by its terms, limited actions for
professional malpractice. In contrast, the Medical-Hospital Liability
Act provides special protections and immunities for a group as specific
as nurse anesthetists.lll
In Taylor, the court recognized a crisis that justified special protec-
tion accorded to a broad class of people- professionals. The Nebraska
Medical-Hospital Liability Act, purporting to address the same crisis,
provides protections limited to certain members of a distinct, cogniza-
ble class. "[W]here a general law can be made applicable, no special
law shall be enacted."118
Yet, it may be argued that health care providers are a distinct class
within professionals and the Legislature acted pursuant to its motive
to continue the availability of health care.1 19 However, in doing so, the
Legislature has singled out a special type of care for liability protec-
tion. Psychologists may act to cure mental disease; a dentist may cor-
rect oral disease; an osteopath or chiropractor acts on a different
theory of health and wellness altogether. Yet, none are protected de-
spite the fact that all provide health care. To repeat the language
from Low, "[t]he argument made in favor of the necessity [of available
health care] ... loses much of its force when these very desirable bene-
fits are [limited] to certain defined classes."'12 0
A physician who took an x-ray for back pain would be protected; a
chiropractor performing the same activity on the same patient would
not be. A psychiatrist treating mental illness with behavioral therapy
would be protected; a psychologist using the same methods on the
same patient would not be. A physician who removed a wart from a
patient's right foot would be protected, the podiatrist who removed
one from the left would not be. Thus the Nebraska MLdical-Hospital
Liability Act creates two, separate classes-"qualified health care
providers and all other health care providers,"--and affords protection
only to the qualified provider, even though "there is no actual differ-
ence between the two in relation to the object to be accompished."12l
Under equal protection analysis, the argument that the Legislature
116. See supra notes 102-03 and accompanying text.
117. As of January 1987, the class of nurse anesthetists was limited to thirty-eight
members. Interview, supra note 74, at 1. It is difficult to conceive of a more spe-
cially limited group short of naming individuals to receive special protection.
118. NEB. CONST. art. III, § 18.
119. See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
120. Low v. Rees Printing Co., 41 Neb. 127, 136, 59 N.W. 362, 364 (1894). See also supra
note 91 and accompanying text.
121. Continental Ins. Co. v. Smrha, 131 Neb. 791, 794 n.5, 270 N.W. 122, 125 n.5 (1936).
See supra notes 98-99 and accompanying text. The exclusion of other health care
providers has not gone unnoticed by these groups. Dr. Robert Todd, testifying on
L.B. 692, noted the desire of optometrists to be included as a protected group.
Hearings on L.B. 692 Before the Banking, Commerce and Ins. Comm. of the Ne-
braska Legislature, 88th Leg., 2nd Sess. 30 (1984).
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could act a step at a time would be available. This is not so under
special law analysis. "[I]f objects with similar characteristics and like
relation have been excluded from the operation of the law, then the
... legislation [is]... special."' 22
The situation is analogous to Swanson, in which the court com-
pared the Legislature's purpose of providing access to higher educa-
tion with its means of limiting grants to certain students and certain
colleges1 23
The special laws argument is weaker when the class is people with
damages below and above a certain amount. Here, the object is to pro-
vide health care. Providers are said to be leaving or not entering the
field because of the cost of insurance; high damage awards contribute
directly to high insurance rates. Although these provisions may of-
fend other constitutional provisions, they are not special laws.124 L.B.
425 and its $250,000 limit on noneconomic damages operates equally on
all who suffer injury. The limitation of the Nebraska Medical-Hospi-
tal Liability Act, assuming that it applies to all health care providers
and not special listed categories, operates equally on all injured seek-
ing health care. Although this is a narrower class than those affected
by L.B. 425, the class seems permissible in light of the purpose of the
statute.
In a like manner, collateral source or joint and several liability
modifications would seem permissible as long as the class chosen cor-
responds with the legislative purpose. If both reforms applied to all
plaintiffs, no issue could be raised. If the reforms applied to patients
of health care providers, broadly defined, both would seem permissi-
ble as cost-cutting measures. However, another provision of the Ne-
braska Constitution provides arguments against absolute limitations
of liability. We turn now to this consideration.
B. Open Courts
1. Historical Background
The Nebraska Constitution contains an "open courts" provision
which states that "[a]ll courts shall be open, and every person, for any
injury done him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a
remedy by due course of law, and justice administered without denial
or delay." 25 If interpreted with anything approaching the interpreta-
122. State ex rel. Dawson County v. Farmers & Merchants Irrigation Co., 59 Neb. 1, 4,
80 N.W. 52, 53 (1899), see also supra notes 92-93 and accompanying text.
123. See supra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
124. It should be noted, however, that even this classification has been held to create
special laws by courts of other states. See Wright v. Central DuPage Hosp., 63 M1.
2d 313, 330, 347 N.E.2d 736, 743 (1976).
125. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13.
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tion of early Nebraska courts, this section is a bar to absolute limits on
damages.
The argument is simple. Due care is a duty imposed by law. Negli-
gence is a breach of that duty. If injury results, a remedy must be had.
If a person is denied recovery when the breach causes more than a
certain amount of damage, no remedy is available for the excess
damages.
An example is more helpful. In FRorida Patient's Compensation
Fund v. Von Stetina,126 plaintiff Susan Von Stetina was severely in-
jured in an automobile accident. She was taken to a Florida hospital
where she came through surgery "very nicely." Following the surgery,
she was placed on a ventilator to assist her breathing. Ventilated pa-
tients require injections of a muscle paralyzing drug at forty-five min-
ute intervals to avoid "fighting" the ventilation with involuntary
muscle spasms. Although exactly what happened is unclear, the hos-
pital nursing staff neglected the injections for two hours. Von Stetina
suffered severe brain damage due to oxygen deprivation, and requires
nursing care twenty-four hours a day.127
A $12.47 million malpractice verdict was recovered against the hos-
pital. Florida law shifted liability to a patient compensation fund and
allowed a maximum payment of $100,000 per year from the fund.128
Nursing and medical expense alone ran to $188,000 per year. The con-
stitutionality of the statute was raised but not decided, as the case was
ultimately remanded for a new trial on evidentiary grounds. It does
serve, however, to illustrate the problem.
Under Nebraska law, Von Stetina's maximum award would have
been exhausted well before her forty-year life expectancy. A portion
of her injury would be a wrong without a remedy. This is contrary to
rights guaranteed in our state constitution.
The early cases interpreting the open courts clause fall into three
classes and can roughly be described by clauses of the section. First, it
is required that "all courts shall be open." Thus, in State ex rel Goffv.
Dodge County,12 9 a tax assessment action, the board proceeded on the
complaint of an unnamed witness, had not reduced its findings to writ-
ing,130 and had not considered any evidence. The court issued a writ of
mandamus to reverse the board's action. Similarly, the court always
has held that agreements to arbitrate do not deprive the plaintiff of
access to the courts and that failure to arbitrate may not be main-
126. 474 So. 2d 783 (Fla. 1985).
127. Id. at 785.
128. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.54(2)(b) (West 1981). The Florida Legislature subse-
quently raised the maximum annual payment from the patient compensation
fund to one million dollars per year. Id § 768.54(2)(b) (West 1986).
129. 20 Neb. 595, 31 N.W. 117 (1887).
130. Id. at 604, 31 N.W. at 121-22.
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tained as a defense.13 '
The open courts clause also prohibits a state court from granting a
dismissal prior to the presentation of evidence when any issue of fact
is present that might bear on the outcome.132 Further, the court may
not dismiss a case prior to its conclusion even after fraud or perjury by
a party.133 The clause also guarantees access to the courts regardless
of a claimant's ability or inability to pay fees.' 3 4
Second, it is required that "every person, for any injury done to
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by
due course of law."'1 35 In State ex rel. Benton v. Elder136 a writ of
mandamus was granted to compel the Legislature to declare the re-
sults of an election, over separation of powers objections. "[I]s there
no remedy either on behalf of the persons elected to office or of the
public? If not, then the boast of the common law that there is no
wrong without remedy is without foundation. Our constitution, how-
ever, is broader than the common law."137
A significant case for present purposes is Wilfong v. Omaha &
Council Bluffs Street Ry.138 In Wilfong, plaintiff's nine-year-old de-
cedent was killed by an Omaha streetcar. The plaintiff brought suit
against the owner on two causes of action, a statutory wrongful death
proceeding and a claim for $10,000 in pain and suffering damages. The
defendant claimed that in accordance with the common law maxim
actio personalis moritur cum persona,139 the pain and suffering action
died with the decedent. The Wilfong court rejected the defense and
raised the right to recover in tort to constitutional dimensions:
In a broad sense, the claim for personal injury recognized and created by this
constitutional provision, as applied to torts, is "a chose in action." As this
constitutional provision neither expressly nor by necessary implication re-
quires the institution of a suit prior to the injured person's death as a condi-
tion precedent to recovery... nor in any manner conditions the remedy it
provides on that fact, the amount that the injured person would recover in his
lifetime would amount to damages to his personal estate .... Therefore, the
cause of action does not abate, but survives.1 4 0
131. Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. Hon, 66 Neb. 555, 558, 92 N.W. 746, 747 (1902). See also
Phoenix Ins. Co. v. Zlotky, 66 Neb. 584, 92 N.W. 736 (1902). This is true even
when the agreement is procured by collective bargaining. Rentschler v. Missouri
P. R.R., 126 Neb. 493,505, 253 N.W. 694, 700 (1934). Rentschler was reaffirmed by
Poppert v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 187 Neb. 297, 189 N.W.2d 469 (1971).
132. Temple v. Cotton Transfer Co., 126 Neb. 287, 290, 253 N.W. 349, 350 (1934).
133. Fitch v. Martin, 80 Neb. 60, 61, 113 N.W. 796, 797 (1907).
134. Douglas County v. Vinsonhaler, 82 Neb. 810, 815, 118 N.W. 1058, 1060-61 (1908).
135. NEB. CONST. art. I, § 13.
136. 31 Neb. 169, 47 N.W. 710 (1891).
137. Id at 185, 47 N.W. at 715 (Maxwell, J., concurring).
138. 129 Neb. 600, 262 N.W. 537 (1935).
139. "A personal right of action dies with the person." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 29
(5th ed. 1979).
140. Wilfong v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 129 Neb. 610, 611,262 N.W. 537, 542 (1935)(em-
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A second significant case in which the court acted to preserve
rights guaranteed under this clause is First Trust Co. v. Smith.141
First Trust involved an emergency with the Legislature acting to deny
a remedy in conflict with this section. The Legislature had enacted
three sequential two-year moratoriums on foreclosures, from 1933 to
1935,142 from 1935 to 1937,143 and from 1937 to 1939.144 Since the two
subsequent acts were amendatory of the first act, the court construed
the question as whether the Legislature could, consistent with this
section, act to suspend all foreclosures in the state for six years.145 To
strike the legislation, the court specifically and deliberately used the
Nebraska Constitution to reach a result not mandated under federal
constitutional law.146
As a basis for upholding the acts, it was urged they were passed on
an emergency basis.147 The court considered this irrelevant. "Emer-
gency does not create power. Emergency does not increase granted
power or remove or diminish the restrictions imposed on power
granted or reserved."'148 The right to a remedy was preserved, "the
conclusion is inescapable that the Nebraska moratorium law... con-
travenes the spirit and express terms of sections thirteen and sixteen,
Art. I of our Constitution, and is wholly invalidated thereby."149
In other cases, this clause also has protected the right to a remedy.
In Smith v. Potter,150 the court held that a foreclosure proceeding did
not bar the lien rights of non-parties to the foreclosure proceeding and
the lien-holders were entitled to a hearing. The statutory foreclosure
proceeding could not cut off common law rights.151
phasis added). Wilfong was reaffirmed in Rehn v. Bingaman, 151 Neb. 196, 36
N.W.2d 856 (1949).
141. 134 Neb. 84, 277 N.W. 762 (1938).
142. Act of Mar. 2, 1933, H.R. 600, ch. 65, 1933 Neb. Laws 301.
143. Act of Feb. 27, 1935, H.R. 1, ch. 41, 1935 Neb. Laws 158.
144. Act of Feb. 16, 1937, L.B. 4, ch. 42, 1937 Neb. Laws 183.
145. First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 91-92, 277 N.W. 762, 767 (1938).
146. "[Ihe question presented necessitates the consideration of cognate provisions of
the state Constitution, some of which are not embraced in the federal Constitu-
tion." Id at 102-03, 277 N.W. at 772.
147. Also noteworthy for the present questions is that rather than bowing to a legisla-
tive determination, the court carefully scrutinized whether the emergency still
existed. "[L]egislation expressly by its terms based upon the ... state of facts to
uphold it, may... cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts change,
even though valid when passed." Id. at 94-95, 277 N.W. at 768.
148. I& at 114-115, 277 N.W. at 777.
149. Id- at 116, 277 N.W. at 778. Section 16 forbids the impairment of contract. NEB.
CONsT. art. I, § 16. A mortgage moratorium was held not to impair contracts
under the federal Constitution in Home Bldg. & Loan Ass'n v. Blaidsell, 290 U.S.
398 (1934). This is another example of the greater protection accorded under the
state constitution.
150. 92 Neb. 39, 137 N.W. 854 (1912).
151. Id- at 53, 137 N.W. at 859.
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The remedy also must be "without .. . delay."152 In Shackley v.
Homer,153 the contest of a will delayed the naming of an executor. It
was urged that the plaintiff's foreclosure petition be delayed until the
completion of the contest of the will and the naming of an executor.
The court found such delay impermissible under this section.154 The
clause also guarantees a speedy criminal trial.155
Similarly, in Appelgate v. Platte Valley Public Power & Irrigation
District,156 this clause was held to guarantee a plaintiff's right to re-
cover permanent damage rather than to sue for each trespass commit-
ted by escaping reservoir water.157
The clause also is said to be "self executing." By this, it is meant
that no ancillary legislation is needed to effectuate the right, although
legislation may provide higher protections of the right secured.158
Thus, the court has found that this provision provides writs and pow-
ers not expressly granted by positive law. For example, in Burnham
v. Bennison,5 9 the court found the provision acted to give the court
power in equity to remove malfeasant trustees. This power vested
constitutionally and was "beyond the power of the legislature to limit
or control."160 In a similar case, the court held that the writ coram
nobis was available for one wrongly convicted, and "made imperative
by section 13, art. I."161
Some cases appear to deviate from the literal language of the sec-
tion. These cases are distinguishable in that no remedy at common
law existed or was believed to exist. In Goddard v. City of Lincoln,162
a notice limitation of liability in negligence for first class cities was
upheld. 63 The rationale of Goddard was that the duty was imposed
by statute and not common law, and as a statutory right, it was
revocable.'6 4
152. NEB. CONST. art I, § 13.
153. 87 Neb. 146, 127 N.W. 145 (1910).
154. Id. at 181, 127 N.W. at 157.
155. State v. Guatney, 207 Neb. 501,506-07,299 N.W.2d 538,542 (1980). Although med-
ical malpractice review panels now are voluntary, and thus outside the scope of
this article, the panels as administered prior to 1984 raise severe questions under
this aspect of the open courts provision. See infra note 175.
156. 136 Neb. 280, 285 N.W. 585 (1939).
157. Id. at 286, 285 N.W. at 589. The decision is of significance should the Legislature
consider periodic payment as a feature of tort reform.
158. Wilfong v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 129 Neb. 600, 608, 262 N.W. 537, 541 (1935).
159. 121 Neb. 291, 236 N.W. 745 (1931).
160. Id. at 298, 236 N.W. at 748.
161. Carlsen v. State, 129 Neb. 84, 96, 261 N.W. 339, 346, cert. denied, 293 U.S. 607
(1934).
162. 69 Neb. 594, 96 N.W. 273 (1903).
163. Id. at 597, 96 N.W. at 275.
164. Originally, actions against a municipal corporation were conceived of as actions
against the people of the city, since the municipality had no status as a corporate
person. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 Term Rep. 667, 100 Eng. Rep. 359 (1798),
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In Muller v. Nebraska Methodist Hospital 165 the court upheld the
common law doctrine of charitable immunity. The Muller court
rested its decision on its reasoning that "[i]t is a primary duty of the
courts to safeguard this declaration of right and remedy. But where no
right or remedy exists, under either the common law or some statute,
this constitutional provision creates none."166 Clearly, the right to be
made whole from injuries caused by another's negligence existed at
common law and such right is protected under section 13.
However, it is noteworthy that the court later felt compelled to
reverse itself. Myers v. Drozda 167 overruled Muller, relying on section
13.168 In Imig v. March,169 the court again was compelled by section 13
to overrule the doctrine of spousal immunity.170
While the right to be made whole is protected by the constitution,
the court has held on several occasions that procedural conditions may
be placed on the remedy. The court may require a party to comply
with previous orders of the court in situations of continuing jurisdic-
tion.17 1 The legislature may change the burden of proof without of-
fending this provision.172 Similarly, a choice of law provision in a
contract that denies access to a Nebraska forum but provides meaning-
ful access to a sister state's forum will be enforced, absent fraud or
unequal bargaining power.173
2. Prendergast and Colton
Two recent decisions depart severely from the preceding line of
cases. The first is Prendergast v. Nelson.174 Parts of Prendergast can
be read as consistent with prior cases under section 13. For example,
the portion of the law that upholds mandatory pre-trial medical re-
quoted in W. KEETON, PROSSER AND KEETON ON TORTS § 131, at 1051 (5th ed.
1984). By the 1970s, about half the states retained some form of municipal immu-
nity, although now based on policy reasons. Id. at 1052.
165. 160 Neb. 279, 70 N.W.2d 86 (1955).
166. Id. at 288, 70 N.W.2d at 91. A similar holding concerning parental immunity can
be found in Pullen v. Nowak, 169 Neb. 211, 215-16, 99 N.W.2d 16, 21 (1959).
167. 180 Neb. 183, 141 N.W.2d 852 (1966).
168. Id at 186, 141 N.W.2d at 854.
169. 203 Neb. 537, 279 N.W.2d 382 (1979).
170. Id. at 544-545, 279 N.W.2d at 386.
171. Reed v. Reed, 70 Neb. 779, 98 N.W. 73 (1904). The plaintiff in Reed refused to
comply with an order for the payment of temporary alimony. Id at 784, 98 N.W.
at 75.
172. Clarke v. Weatherly, 131 Neb. 816, 818, 270 N.W. 316, 317 (1936). The legislative
enactment mandated gross negligence as a precondition to recovery under a guest
statute.
173. Haakinson & Beaty Co. v. Inland Ins. Co., 216 Neb 426, 344 N.W.2d 454 (1984). A
concurring justice expressed doubts based on section 13. Id. at 432, 344 N.W.2d at
459 (White, J., concurring).
174. 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
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view panels can be read as consistent with Reed and other cases hold-
ing the legislature or court may place procedural preconditions on
access to the forum.175
However, one portion of Prendergast stands in sharp contrast to
First Trust, Wilfong, Imig, and Myers. Prendergast upheld the
$500,000 limitation on damages, reasoning that the same principle was
involved as that involved when the Legislature raised the degree of
negligence necessary to recover in guest cases. The court further ex-
plained its reasoning, stating that "[i]n enacting the medical malprac-
tice damage limitations, the Legislature is doing no more than
legislatures of other states have done in the enactment of no-fault stat-
utes in tort actions."1 76 This reasoning is flawed because it completely
ignores'the fact that traditional no-fault schemes preserve access to
the courts for excess damages, 177 which would be significant to their
validity under section 13.
The second case is Colton v. Dewey.17s Colton deviates further
from established precedent. In Colton, a ten-year statute of repose
barred the plaintiff's cause of action four years before the plaintiff
discovered the injury. The court upheld the limitation, reasoning
"[t]he requirement... that all courts be open... does not mean that
[time] limits may not be imposed."179 Further, the court held it was
within the power of the legislature to abolish remedies. "'The harm
that has been done is damnum absque injuria-a wrong for which the
law affords no redress.... The legislature is entirely at liberty to cre-
ate new rights or abolish old ones as long as no vested right is dis-
175. However, the Missouri Supreme Court struck down mandatory pretrial review
under an almost identical open courts provision. State ex rel. Cardinal Glennon
Memorial Hasp. v. Gaertner, 583 S.W.2d 107, 110 (Mo. 1979). In any case, a prob-
lem may have existed with the panels and the without delay portion of the stat-
ute. Delays of two years or more appear not to have been uncommon. Compare
Barry v. Bohi, 221 Neb. 651, 380 N.W.2d 249 (1986)(which lasted more than six
years from filing to appellate review). The Department of Insurance estimates
that the average time to close a file under this procedure ranged from one to
three years. Interview, supra note 74.
176. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 121, 256 N.W.2d 657, 672 (1977).
177. Keeton describes no-fault statutes as a partial exemption from tort. The usual
scheme provides that for actions under policy limits, the party may not recover in
tort, but instead recovers from his own carrier. Access to the courts is preserved
for excess amounts. W. KEErON, PRoSSER AND KEETON ON ToRTs § 84, at 607 (5th
ed. 1984).
178. 212 Neb. 126, 321 N.W.2d 913 (1982). Colton was reaffirmed in Rosnick v. Marks,
218 Neb. 499, 507, 357 N.W.2d 186, 191 (1984)(legal malpractice) and Smith v.
Dewey, 214 Neb. 605, 607-08, 335 N.W.2d 530, 532 (1983)(medical malpractice). In
addition, Colton was relied upon in a federal decision upholding a 10-year prod-
ucts liability statute of repose. Groth v. Sandoz, Inc., 601 F. Supp 453,455 (D. Neb.
1984).
179. Colton v. Dewey, 212 Neb. 126, 129, 321 N.W.2d 913, 916 (1982).
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turbed.' "180 Significant is the fact that the borrowed language is from
a New Jersey case. The New Jersey Constitution contains no open
courts clause.
3. Analysis
The borrowed language in Colton might be true in a state where
every person is not guaranteed a remedy, but it can never be true in
Nebraska. Texas, with an open courts clause that is phrased in lan-
guage identical to that of the Nebraska clause, struck down a six-year
statute of repose.18 1 Under an identical Ohio open courts provision,
the Ohio Supreme Court invalidated a four-year statute of repose:
"The appellant has no remedy for an injury to his body when his claim
is extinguished before he knew of the injury or could have reasonably
discovered it.... The language of the Constitution is clear and leaves
little room for maneuvering."18 2 Based on an almost identical open
courts provision, the Utah Supreme Court struck down a ten-year stat-
ute of repose. 8 3 Finally, noting its open courts clause (like Ne-
braska's) stated that "[e]very person . . . ought to find a certain
remedy,"184 the Supreme Court of Rhode Island emphasized that "no
word or section must be assumed to have been unnecessarily or need-
lessly added."185
Colton, and by implication portions of Prendergast, are either clear
error or an abdication of judicial responsibility. Neither possibility is
acceptable. The decisions are aberrational and in conflict with basic
rights secured by our state constitution. The decisions also place Ne-
braska in a clear minority when interpreting the open courts clause.
The logical argument is as follows. The greater includes the lesser;
if it is competent for the legislature to abolish a remedy, it is compe-
tent for it to place any precondition on the remedy that is desired. If
the legislature could abolish plaintiff's right to sue for trespass, it
could require plaintiff to sue for each trespass. The legislature could
thus reestablish charitable immunity, and many hospitals never would
be liable for damages. The same would be true of spousal immunity or
parental immunity. The legislature could go even further and decree
that pain and suffering damages die with the plaintiff or that they
might not be recovered at all.
180. Id at 130, 321 N.W.2d at 916 (quoting Rosenberg v. Town of North Bergen, 61 N.J.
190, 199-200, 293 A.2d 662, 667 (1972)).
181. Sax v. Votteler, 648 S.W.2d 661, 664-67 (Tex. 1983).
182. Hardy v. VerMeulen, 32 Ohio St. 3d 45, 46, 512 N.E.2d 626, 627-28 (1987)(citations
omitted).
183. Berry v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985).
184. R.I. CONST. art. 1, § 5.
185. Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co., 471 A.2d 195, 198 (R.I. 1984). See generally
Lambert, Medical Negligence: Statutes of Repose, 31 ATLA L. REP. 16 (Feb. 1988).
NEBRASKA TORT REFORM
This cannot be so under section 13. Compare the language of
Wilfong-"As this constitutional provision neither expressly nor by
necessary implication requires [here, that the plaintiff's damages be
under a certain amount] ... nor in any manner conditions the remedy
it provides on that fact .... [Tihe cause of action does not abate, but
survives .... 1 8 6 and Elder--"[I]s there no remedy [here, for damages
over the limit]? If not, then the boast of the common law that there is
no wrong without a remedy is without foundation. Our constitution,
however, is broader than the common law." 8 7
It has been suggested that the effect of this provision is to preserve
common law rights existing at the time of the constitution's adoption
from subsequent diminution or abrogation, unless a reasonable substi-
tute is provided.'8 8 The exact nature of the rights incorporated or pre-
served need not be decided here, but the right to be made whole from
a tortious injury suffered must be close to their core. The alternative
is a Susan Von Stetina on Medicaid or receiving no care at all, because
she has exceeded the maximum limit of her award. At a minimum,
section 13 demands full recovery of economic damages.
The right to noneconomic damages is somewhat vague, but con-
sider the following. If excessive noneconomic damages are awarded, a
remittur will be sought and granted. Without a limit, noneconomic
damages never will exceed what is appropriate for the plaintiff. The
limit only can operate to cut off appropriately awarded damages in
direct conflict with the constitutional command that "[e]very person
... shall have a remedy." 8 9
A more sophisticated argument that noneconomic limits are a de-
nial of a remedy is readily available as well. The economic interests of
the plaintiff and contingent fee attorney are adverse to begin with.
Because the attorney recovers a fractional portion of the recovery, the
186. wilfong v. Omaha & C.B. St. Ry., 129 Neb. 600, 611, 262 N.W. 537, 542 (1935). See
supra notes 138-40 and accompanying text.
187. State ex rel Benton v. Elder, 31 Neb. 169, 185, 47 N.W. 710, 715 (1891). See supra
notes 136-37 and accompanying text.
188. Note, Medical Malpractice Statute of Repose: An Unconstitutional Denial of Ac-
cess to the Courts, 63 NEB. L. REv. 150, 176-77 (1983). The author concluded the
statute of repose was unconstitutional under this section. Id. at 191-96. I agree
with the conclusion and urge readers interested in this aspect of tort reform to
review the article.
It is also noted that the statute of repose could lead to the barring of an action
before conception of the plaintiff. In Kenyon v. Hammer, 142 Ariz. 69, 688 P.2d
961 (1984), a nurse misrecorded the blood type of plaintiff's mother as Rh positive
when in fact it was Rh negative. Because of the misrecording, she was not admin-
istered a drug that prevents development of an immune response to Rh positive
blood. Six years later, the plaintiff was conceived. Plaintiff was stillborn because
of destruction of her Rh positive blood cells by the mother's immune response.
The statute had run three years before plaintiff's conception. The court ulti-
mately struck down the statute on equal protection grounds.
189. NEB. CONST. art I., § 13.
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marginal return per unit of effort will cross the marginal cost line sig-
nificantly earlier than would be true if there was no division of inter-
est. Limitations exploit the built-in adversity further by reducing the
ultimate recovery. In fact, the difference may mean a powerful incen-
tive is created to settle prior to trial. At the margin, limits block ac-
cess to the court.190 The open courts argument is essentially an
extension of the Vinsonhaler191 reasoning that inability to pay fees
should not cut off a legitimate claim.
Other aspects of the statute and bill would appear permissible
under the "open courts" clause. A modification of joint and several
liability affects which defendant pays, but does not destroy the rem-
edy. Collateral source modification again ultimately affects only who
pays and not the amount of recovery.
A word needs to be added about the "double deduction" argument
and Nebraska law. The preservation of subrogation rights in L.B. 425
raises an interesting issue. The Nebraska legislation explicitly pre-
served subrogation rights against defendants.192 By way of contrast,
California, in abolishing its collateral source rule, provided that no col-
lateral source could recover against the plaintiff, nor would it be sub-
rogated to the right of the plaintiff against a defendant.193 The
remaining question for Nebraska is whether a collateral source could
recover from a plaintiff.
This problem has been referred to as a double deduction, since the
jury would deduct a first time, the collateral source a second time.194
However, as judicially construed, no double deduction problem would
be posed in Nebraska. Subrogation is either "equitable" or "conven-
tional." Equitable subrogation is restitutionary and is triggered by un-
just enrichment.195 Since the jury must consider collateral payments,
presumably it excludes these amounts from damages. There is no "en-
richment"; therefore, there is no subrogation as against the plaintiff.
Conventional subrogation is contractual. This may or may not be
190. For a more explicit discussion of how caps increase the built-in adversity of finan-
cial interest between attorney and client, see Roa v. Lodi Medical Group, 37 Cal.
3d 920, 942-48, 211 Cal. Rptr. 77, 91-96, 695 P.2d 164, 178-83 (1985)(Bird, C.J., dis-
senting), appeal dismissed, 474 U.S. 990 (1985).
191. Douglas County v. Vinsonhaler, 82 Neb. 810, 118 N.W. 1058 (1908).
192. "Nothing in sections 11 to 13 of this act shall interfere with any right of subroga-
tion nor shall it preclude the collection of the same from any defendant." L.B.
425, § 12(2), 90th Leg., 1st Sess. (1987).
193. CAL. CIV. CODE § 3333.1(b) (West Supp. 1988).
194. Carson v. Maurer, 120 N.H. 925, 940, 424 A.2d 825, 836 (1980).
195. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION § 162 (1937). See also Cagle, Inc. v. Sammons, 198
Neb. 595, 602, 254 N.W.2d 398, 403 (1977) ("The doctrine of subrogation includes
every instance in which one person pays a debt for which another is primarily
liable"); cited with approval in R. WORKS, NEBRASKA PROPERTY & LIABILITY IN-
SURANCE LAW § 9.1, at 191 (1985). Here, the debt is not paid by the tortfeasor to
the plaintiff.
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the same thing-"[jludicial opinions... often tacitly assum[e] that the
contractual provisions are declaratory of the rights which equitable
principles would decree.". 9 6
Regardless of whether theoretical differences exist, in Nebraska
the right of the subrogee always has been closely equated with' the
right of the subrogor. An early court may well have resolved the issue
when it stated that "no cause of action can exist on behalf of the in-
surer, unless it existed in favor of the insured." 9 7 While the case is
cited for the proposition that the insurer has no greater rights against
third parties than the insured, it also would seem to say that when the
insured presumably has never recovered, there is nothing to subro-
gate.198 To the extent this interpretation is true, no constitutional
problems are raised. If a double deduction is allowed on a contractual
basis, the issue is identical to those raised by a maximum limitation on
economic damages. In addition, due process issues of fairness may be
raised.199 It is to these issues arising under due process and the paral-
lel guarantee of equal protection that we now turn.
C. Federal Equal Protection and Due Process Analysis
Although the Nebraska Constitution carries unique guarantees
that appear dispositive of the majority of tort reform issues, the possi-
bility of aberrant interpretation of the provisions necessitates a review
of federal law. Some courts, acting under either federal due process or
equal protection analysis, have held various features of tort reform
packages unconstitutional.
1. Traditional Equal Protection Tests
Traditional equal protection testing involves a two-tiered analysis.
If the legislation involves a "suspect" class or impinges on "fundamen-
tal" rights, it is subjected to "low scrutiny." Examples of suspect
classes are race200 and national origin.20 ' Examples of fundamental
rights include the right of religious expression,202 the right to vote, 203
196. R. WORKS, supra note 195, § 9.1, at 191 (1985).
197. Omaha & R.V. Ry. v. Granite State Fire Ins. Co., 53 Neb. 514,519, 73 N.W. 950, 951
(1898)(quoted in R. WORKS, supra note 195, § 9.2, at 193).
198. The Nebraska rule subrogates the employer directly to the employee's right as
against third parties in workers' compensation cases. NEB. REV. STAT. § 48-118
(1984). Double deduction could occur if the rule was that the employee pro-
ceeded directly against third parties and that a lien attached to the proceeds, but
would not occur under the Nebraska rule.
199. See infra notes 235-40 and accompanying text.
200. E.g., Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 8 (1967).
201. E.g., Hernandez v. Texas, 347 U.S. 475, 481 (1954).
202. E.g., Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 402 (1963).
203. E.g., Harper v. Virginia Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 667 (1966).
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the right to marry,20 4 the right to travel,205 the right to make repro-
ductive decisions,206 and the right to political association.207 In gen-
eral, fundamental rights have been defined as those "explicitly or
implicitly guaranteed by the constitution." 208 As has been stated, "the
right to recover the full extent of damages one is owed from a
tortfeasor is not on the list."209
Low scrutiny is exactly what it implies. "The constitutional safe-
guard is offended only if the classification rests on grounds [that are]
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the State's objective .... A
[statute] will not be set aside [as discriminatory] if any state of facts
reasonably may be conceived to justify it."210 The creativity in in-
venting facts to justify the legislation at times resembles that neces-
sary to attack a perpetuities problem. Further, considerable latitude is
given in areas of social and economic welfare:
In the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not violate the Equal
Protection Clause merely because the classifications made by its laws are im-
perfect. If the classification has some "reasonable basis" it does not offend the
Constitution simply because the classification "is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality."2 11
In addition, it has been said that "[w]here there was evidence
before the legislature reasonably supporting the classification, liti-
gants may not procure invalidation of the legislation merely by
tendering evidence in court the legislature was mistaken."232
In contrast, if a statute reaches a protected area, the burden is
shifted to the state to show the statute was "necessary to promote a
compelling governmental interest."213 If a compelling interest can be
found, the means utilized to promote that interest must be the least
restrictive possible.
The two-tiered test left much to be desired. In practice, the choice
of low level scrutiny was merely a precursor of the outcome, involving
little analysis. Beginning with cases involving gender,2 -14 intermediate
scrutiny was introduced. This level also has been applied to illegiti-
204. E.g., Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 383-84 (1978).
205. E.g., Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 629-30 (1969).
206. E.g., Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152-54 (1973).
207. E.g,, Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 30 (1968). For a discussion of fundamental
rights, see generally NoWAK, ROTUNDA & YOUNG, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 418
(1978).
208. San Antonio Indep. School Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33-34 (1973).
209. Williams v. Lallie Kemp Charity Hosp., 428 So. 2d 1000, 1010 (La. Ct. App. 1983),
cer denied, 434 So. 2d 1093 (La. 1983).
210. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961).
211. Danridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
212. Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery Co., 449 U.S. 456, 464 (1981).
213. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 638 (1969).
214. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190 (1976).
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macy.2 1 5 The test at intermediate scrutiny is subject to varying formu-
lations. In Reed v. Reed,216 the Court said that the legislatively created
classes "must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and
substantial relation to the object of the legislation."217 Further, the
legislation "must serve important governmental objectives and must
be substantially related to those objectives."2 18
To further complicate matters, the Court has been tightening low
scrutiny by undertaking a more searching examination of legislative
purpose.2 1 9 This feature may represent heightened judicial scrutiny
or may indicate the lines between due process and equal protection
have begun to blur.
The majority of cases involving equal protection deal with matters
other than maximum damage limitations. A line of cases dealing with
medical malpractice review panels is apposite only in terms of the
level of scrutiny chosen, since mandatory review itself has been abol-
ished in Nebraska. Further, the courts applying equal protection anal-
ysis were reviewing a precondition on a remedy, not an elimination of
the remedy.
With this in mind, note that the majority of courts have held medi-
cal malpractice screening panels do not violate equal protection. The
courts generally have used a low scrutiny test. The reasoning is that
the panels reasonably are related to the legitimate legislative purpose
of deterring meritless claims or of reducing health care costs through
alternate dispute resolution.2 20 In Carter v. Sparkman221 the court
215. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
216. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
217. Id at 76.
218. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190, 197 (1976). The test is patterned after F.S. Royster
Guano Co. v. Virginia, 253 U.S. 412 (1920). Royster, at the time, was not height-
ened scrutiny as the Court stated its test that classes "must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having a fair and sub-
stantial relation to the object of the legislation, so that all persons similarly cir-
cumstanced shall be treated alike." Id at 415.
219. See, e.g., Western & Southern Life Ins. Co. v. State Board of Equalization, 451
U.S. 648, 668 (1981); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 448 (1972).
220. Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146, 149-50 (5th Cir. 1981), affrV,
472 F. Supp. 468, 471-72 (E.D. La. 1979); Diantonio v. Northampton-Accomack
Memorial Hosp., 628 F.2d 287, 291 (4th Cir. 1980); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591
F.2d 1164, 1173-74 (5th Cir. 1979); DiFilippo v. Beck, 520 F. Supp. 1009, 1015-16 (D.
Del. 1981); Hines v. Elkhart Gen. Hosp., 465 F. Supp. 421, 430-31 (N.D. Ind. 1979),
aff'd, 603 F.2d 646 (7th Cir. 1979); Eastin v. Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 585, 570
P.2d 744, 753 (1977); Lacy v. Green, 428 A.2d 1171, 1177-78 (Del. Super. Ct. 1981);
Suchit v. Baxt, 176 N.J.L. 407, 420-23, 423 A.2d 670, 676-77 (N.J. Super Ct. Law
Div. 1980); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55 A.D.2d 304, 313-15, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128-29
(1976), af1d, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372 N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977); Beatty v. Ak-
ron City Hosp., 67 Ohio St. 2d 483, 488-92, 424 N.E.2d 586, 591-95 (1981); State ex
reL Strykowski v. Wilkie, 81 Wis. 2d 491, 506-12, 261 N.W.2d 434, 441-44 (1978).
221. 335 So. 2d 802 (Fla. 1976), cerL denied, 429 U.S. 1041 (1977).
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upheld panel review, but described the procedure as being at the
"outer limits of constitutional tolerance."222 The court in Boucher v.
Sayeed 223 found no "insurance crisis" existed, and struck down review
panels under low scrutiny analysis. Boucher is perhaps distinguish-
able since no legislative findings were declared in the Act in
question.224
Other cases have upheld collateral source rule abrogations under
low scrutiny, reasoning the elimination of the rule is reasonably re-
lated to holding health care costs down and promoting the availability
of insurance.225 Likewise, the majority of courts allow a shorter stat-
ute of limitations for medical malpractice, including abrogation of toll-
ing provisions for undiscoverable injury, under low scrutiny, reasoning
the statutes reasonably are related to controlling health care costs.
Some courts note that a large component of malpractice insurance cost
is the possibility that a suit may be brought many years later.226
Two Ohio cases have struck down maximum damage limitations
under low scrutiny. Simon v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center227 struck a
$200,000 limit on general damages as violative of both state and federal
equal protection without detailed analysis. In Duren v. Suburban
Community Hospital,228 a second Ohio court reached the same result,
again without detailed analysis-"Simply stated, the legislative
scheme of shifting responsibility for loss from one of the most affluent
segments of society to those who are most unable to sustain that bur-
den, i.e., horribly injured or maimed individuals, is not only inconceiv-
222. Id. at 806.
223. 459 A.2d 87 (R.I. 1983).
224. Id. at 93.
225. Baker v. Vanderbilt Univ., 616 F. Supp. 330, 331-32 (M.D. Tenn. 1985); Eastin v.
Broomfield, 116 Ariz. 576, 584-85, 570 P.2d 744, 752-53 (1977); Barme v. Wood, 37
Cal. 3d 174, 180-81, 689 P.2d 446, 449-50, 207 Cal. Rptr. 816, 819-21 (1984); Pinillos
v. Cedars of Lebanon Hosp., 403 So. 2d 365, 367 (Fla. 1981); Rudolph v. Iowa Meth-
odist Medical Center, 293 N.W.2d 550, 557-58 (Iowa 1980); Everett v. Goldman, 359
So. 2d 1256, 1265-67 (La. 1978); Perna v. Pirozzi, 92 N.J. 446, 457-58, 457 A.2d 431,
437 (1983).
226. See, e.g., Fitz v. Dolyak, 712 F.2d 330, 332-33 (8th Cir. 1983); Houk v. Furman, 613
F. Supp. 1022, 1034-36 (D. Me. 1985); Reese v. Rankin Fite Memorial Hosp., 403
So. 2d 158, 160-61 (Ala. 1981); Landgraff v. Wagner, 26 Ariz. App. 49, 546 P.2d 26
(1976), appeal dismissed, 429 U.S. 806 (1976); Carmichael v. Silbert, 422 N.E.2d
1330, 1332-33 (Ind. App. 1981); Armijo v. Tandysh, 98 N.M. 181, 183-84, 646 P.2d
1245, 1247-48 (1981), cert. quashed, 98 N.M. 336, 648 P.2d 794 (1962), cert denied,
459 U.S. 1016 (1982); Roberts v. Durham County Hosp., 56 N.C. App. 533, 540, 289
S.E.2d 879 (1982), aff'd, 307 N.C. 465, 298 S.E.2d 384 (1983); Harrison v. Schrader,
569 S.W.2d 822, 826 (Tenn. 1978). In Sax v. Votteler, 636 S.W.2d 461, 464 (Tex.
App. 1982), rev'd, 648 S.W.2d 661, 663-67 (Tex. 1983), a six-year statute of limita-
tions initially was upheld under low scrutiny. The Texas Supreme Court re-
versed based on an open courts clause that is identical to the Nebraska clause.
227. 3 Ohio Op. 3d 164, 355 N.E.2d 903 (C.P. Cuyahoga County 1976).
228. 24 Ohio Misc. 2d 25, 495 N.E.2d 51 (Ct. Common Pleas 1985).
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able, but shocking to this court's conscience." 22 9
In a Colorado case, Austin v. Litvakpo the court also struck down
a shortened statute of limitations under low scrutiny. The statute was
tolled only if the injury was fraudulently concealed or consisted of
failure to remove a foreign object. The Austin court noted that claims
based on fraudulent concealment were more likely to be frivolous or
difficult to prove than claims for simple malpractice that were over
two years old. Thus, the court concluded the legislature lacked a ra-
tional basis for the distinction.2 3 1
In contrast, Fein v. Permanente Medical Group 232 upheld a
$250,000 limitation on noneconomic damages under low scrutiny. The
California court stated: "[lit appears obvious that ... a ceiling of
$250,000 on the recovery of noneconomic damages-is rationally re-
lated to the objective of reducing the costs of malpractice defendants
and their insurers."23 3 The dissent was vehement: "Injured infants
are prohibited from recovering more than three or four thousand dol-
lars per year, no matter how excruciating their pain .... The idea of
preserving insurance by imposing huge sacrifices on a few victims is
logically perverse."2 3 4
2. Traditional Due Process Tests
Although the lines between equal protection and due process often
are blurred by the courts, the two modes of analysis do form distinct
constitutional provisions with distinct analysis. "Due process empha-
sizes fairness between the state and the individual dealing with the
state, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation may be
treated. Equal protection on the other hand, emphasizes disparity in
treatment by a State between classes of individuals whose situations
are arguably indistinguishable."235 An example of a situation in which
equal protection might be violated with no accompanying due process
violation is where a plaintiff lets a statute of limitations run, but the
statute is found to apply to an invalid class. Thus, fairness with the
individual would not be offended, but the statute would be an imper-
missible classification. 23 6
The test for due process violations was best stated in Nebbia v. New
229. Id. at 28, 495 N.E.2d at 56.
230. 682 P.2d 41 (Colo. 1984).
231. Id. at 50.
232. 38 Cal. 3d 137, 695 P.2d 665, 211 Cal. Rptr. 368 (1985), appeal denied, 474 U.S. 892
(1985).
233. Id. at 159, 695 P.2d at 680, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 383.
234. Id. at 171-73, 695 P.2d at 689-90, 211 Cal. Rptr. at 392-93 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
235. Ross v. Moffit, 417 U.S. 600, 609 (1974).
236. This situation is found in Carmichael v. Silbert, 422 N.E.2d 1330, 1333 (Ind. App.
1981).
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York,237 in which the Court stated "[i]f the laws passed are seen to
have a reasonable relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are
neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the requirements of due process
are satisfied." 238 The obvious result is that it is difficult for a law to
offend federal due process. 239
By a majority of courts, medical malpractice screening panels have
been held not to violate the due process clause. These courts reason
that medical malpractice is a tort with distincf characteristics, and it is
neither unfair nor discriminatory to treat these individuals
differently.240
3. Duke Power and the White Dictum
Another factor that comes into play in federal due process analysis
is the so-called White dictum. The issue arose when the United States
Supreme Court considered workers' compensation laws in New York
Central Ry. v. White.241 The Court in White held that workers' com-
pensation laws did not violate the federal due process standard. How-
ever, the Court added, "it perhaps may be doubted whether the state
could abolish all rights of action on the one hand, or all defenses on
the other, without setting up something adequate in their stead."2 42 In
the workers' compensation statutes context, the substitution for un-
limited damages was strict liability on the part of the employer. A
right had been given up on one side, defenses on the other. The dic-
tum raises the question of whether this sort of quid pro quo is
necessary.
The issue of whether a quid pro quo is required when a common
law right is abrogated also was left open in Duke Power Co. v. Caro-
lina Environmental Study Group, Inc.243 Duke Power involved a con-
237. 291 U.S. 502 (1934).
238. Id. at 537.
239. It also would appear that any law offending federal due process would be a special
law under NEB. CONsT. art. III, § 18. See supra notes 116-24 and accompanying
text.
240. See, e.g., Seoane v. Ortho Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 660 F.2d 146 (5th Cir. 1981), affg
472 F. Supp. 468, 472-73 (E.D. La. 1979); Woods v. Holy Cross Hosp., 591 F.2d 1164,
1175-77 (5th Cir. 1979); Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256, 1267-69 (La. 1978);
Linder v. Smith, 629 P.2d 1187, 1191-92 (Mont. 1981); Comiskey v. Arlen, 55
A.D.2d 304, 312-15, 390 N.Y.S.2d 122, 128-30 (1976), aff'd, 43 N.Y.2d 696, 372
N.E.2d 34, 401 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1977). Some of the cases upholding the panels may
be distinguishable as involving sovereign imniunity-the greater right to abolish
liability includes the lesser right to place limitations or conditions upon it. For
cases involving claims against sovereign entities, see Hoffman v. United States,
767 F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1985) and Williams v. Lallie Kemp Charity Hosp., 428 So.
2d 1000 (La. Ct. App. 1983), cert denied, 434 So. 2d 1093 (IL 1983).
241. 243 U.S. 188 (1917).
242. Id. at 201.
243. 438 U.S. 59 (1978).
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gressionally set maximum liability of $560 million for a nuclear power
accident. The limit was based upon "expert appraisals of the exceed-
ingly small risk of a nuclear incident involving claims in excess of $560
million." 2 Further, the Court noted that in the event the limit was
exceeded, "Congress would likely enact extraordinary relief provi-
sions to provide additional relief, in accord with prior practice." 245
The legislative history also supported the notion the limit was not "an
ultimate bar to further relief of the public."246 Thus, the case is likely
to be distinguishable.
In Johnson v. St Vincent Hospital, Inc.,247 the Indiana Supreme
Court sustained a $500,000 limitation on the strength of analogy to
Duke Power-"[b]oth involved a private industry which was reluctant
to provide its services because of shortages for the effective insurance
for the risks attendant to production."2 4 8 Further, to the extent that a
quid pro quo requirement was asserted, the Act met it by providing a
more likely source of recovery. As the Johnson court noted,
"[i]nsurance companies have been known to go bankrupt and to leave
those having claims and judgments against insureds without any
means of collection." 249
It is important to remember the White dictum arose in a due pro-
cess analysis and thus, it has no relation whatsoever to the question of
special laws or open courts. The majority of courts have held due pro-
cess and equal protection alone do not mandate a quid pro quo.2 50 It
also should be noted that all of these cases arose in the context of med-
ical review panels. Review in and of itself may add delay or expense,
but does not have a predictable effect on the amount of damages. In
the context of limitation on damages, the issue may become impor-
tant.2 1 With reference to the aspect of maximum limits, this question
was left open in Wright v. Central DuPage Hospital Association.25 2
244. Id. at 85.
245. Id. In fact, the Act was altered in 1987 to raise the limit to $7 billion. Omaha
World-Herald, July 31,1987, at 11, col. 1. The change further established a proce-
dure whereby if "a single accident should prove even more catastrophic, the pres-
ident would immediately name a commission to recommend additional
compensation from the federal treasury." Id.
246. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl. Study Group, Inc., 438 U.S. 59,86 (1978)(quot-
ing H.R. REP. No. 883, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. 6-7 (1965)).
247. 273 Ind. 374, 404 N.E.2d 585 (1980).
248. Id. at 395-96, 404 N.E.2d at 599.
249. Id at 399, 404 N.E.2d at 601.
250. Everett v. Goldman, 359 So. 2d 1256 (La. 1978).
251. Justice White dissented from a denial of certiorari in Fein v. Permanente Medical
Group, 474 U.S. 892 (1985), and would have resolved the question. Id- at 894-95
(White, J., dissenting).
252. 63 Il. 2d 313, 329, 347 N.E.2d 736, 742 (1976).
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4. Heightened Scrutiny and Medical Tort Reform
Some recent state cases have found various tort reform measures
unconstitutional under several forms of heightened scrutiny. The
trigger for heightened scrutiny has been either an elevation of the sta-
tus of the right to recover or definition of malpractice victims as a
quasi-suspect class.
Carson v. Maurer253 struck down a collateral source abrogation
and a $250,000 limitation on noneconomic damages under intermediate
scrutiny. To do so, the Carson court elevated the nature of the right to
recover. The rights were not fundamental, but were "sufficiently im-
portant to require that the restrictions imposed on those rights be sub-
jected to a more rigorous judicial scrutiny than allowed under the
rational basis test."2M
The Coburn v. Agustin255 court used both an important right and a
quasi-suspect class analysis to strike down a collateral source abroga-
tion that applied only in medical malpractice cases. First, the court
concluded that although the right was not fundamental, the Kansas
open courts clause made it "an important substantive right."256 This
alone was not enough to trigger high scrutiny. However, the court
also found "[m]edical malpractice victims generally have no control
over the inception of their afflictions or illnesses and even less choice
concerning the medical mis, mal, or nonfeasance practiced on them.
Moreover, victims of medical malpractice are relegated to a position of
political powerlessness."257 The court then struck down the statute,
reasoning "[i]n this case, a privilege is being created on behalf of doc-
tors and insurance companies, while the class that pays the price is
comprised of injured and powerless malpractice victims." 258
Jones v. State Board of Medicine2 59 also applied intermediate scru-
tiny based on the classification created by a statutory $300,000 damage
limit. The Idaho court held: "[I]t is apparent from the face of the Act
that a discriminatory classification is created based on the degree of
injury."26 0 The court ultimately remanded the case to develop evi-
dence of whether there was an "insurance crisis" in the state of Idaho.
A dissenting justice in American Bank & Trust Co. v. Community
253. 120 N.H. 925, 424 A.2d 825 (1980).
254. Id. at 932, 424 A.2d at 830.
255. 627 F. Supp 983 (D. Kan. 1985).
256. Id at 994.
257. Id
258. Id. at 996. Coburn is in direct conflict with Crowe v. Wigglesworth, 623 F. Supp.
699 (D. Kan. 1985). In Crowe, the earlier of the two, a different district judge
upheld the Act under low scrutiny. Id. at 704-05.
259. 97 Idaho 859, 555 P.2d 399 (1976), cert denied, 431 U.S. 914 (1977).
260. Id.
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Hospital26 1 developed the quasi-suspect class further:
Various inherent characteristics of the burdened group prevent it from ade-
quately advancing its interests in the political process. It is an extraordinarily
small group to be singled out to carry the burden of a general "crisis". Its
members ... may be physically or mentally disabled. Membership in the
group is involuntary... At the time MICRA was enacted, the individuals
who were to make up the group were unaware of that fact.2 62
Other cases proceed to heightened scrutiny by examining the na-
ture of the right involved. In White v. Montana263 the court looked to
state law when determining the right to recover for injury is of a spe-
cial character. Montana's open courts provision was the trigger of
strict scrutiny. "The language 'every injury' embraces all recognized
compensable components of injury, including the right to be compen-
sated for physical pain and mental anguish and loss of the enjoyment
of living. Therefore, strict scrutiny attaches."264 Nebraska's open
courts provision contains the same language.
The North Dakota Supreme Court struck down an absolute dam-
age limitation of $300,000 in Arneson v. Olson.26 5 The decision is par-
tially distinguishable in that what is called intermediate scrutiny
under a federal test is the lowest scrutiny available under North Da-
kota law.266 However, the decision is interesting in two respects.
First, the court, like the Nebraska court in First Trust Co. v. Smith,267
refused to bow to a legislative determination that an insurance crisis
existed when in fact none did.268 This can be viewed as an examina-
tion of legislative purpose. Second, the court related legislative pur-
pose to legislative means in a formulation that is useful when
considering the Medical-Hospital Liability Act--"[C]ertainly the limi-
tation of recovery does not provide adequate compensation to patients
with meritorious claims, on the contrary, it does just the opposite for
the most seriously injured claimants. It does nothing towards the
elimination of nonmeritorious claims." 26 9
Baptist Hospital v. Baber270 struck down an absolute limitation of
$500,000 on medical malpractice with the court utilizing equal protec-
261. 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670, 204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984), vacating 33 Cal. 3d 674, 660
P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983).
262. I. at 397, 683 P.2d at 695, 204 Cal. Rptr. at 697 (Bird, C.J., dissenting).
263. 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983).
264. Id- at 369, 661 P.2d at 1275.
265. 270 N.W.2d 125 (N.D. 1978).
266. Id at 132-33.
267. 134 Neb. 84, 277 N.W. 762 (1938). See also supra notes 141-49 and accompanying
text
268. Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 136 (N.D. 1978). North Dakota had the sixth
lowest malpractice rates in the nation at the time. Id.
269. IdA. at 135-36.
270. 672 S.W.2d 296 (Tex. Ct. App. 1984), aff'd on other grounds, 714 S.W.2d 310 (Tex.
1986).
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tion analysis, relying on the language from Arneson quoted above.271
A second approach to heightened scrutiny is illustrated in Ameri-
can Bank & Trust Co. v. Community Hospital.272 In American Bank
the majority noted that "the constitutionality of a statute predicated
on the existence of a particular state of facts may be challenged by
showing that those facts have ceased to exist."273 This reasoning was
followed with a finding that the crisis of 1974-75 was not caused by
increases in the frequency or amount of judgments, but by losses suf-
fered by insurers in stock market investments.274
The court in Sibley v. Board of Supervisors275 took an entirely dif-
ferent approach to heightened scrutiny. The court initially upheld a
maximum damage limitation of $500,000 against due process and equal
protection challenges. The Sibley court rejected these constitutional
challenges on first hearing, stating that "[t]he right of malpractice
claimants to sue for damages caused them by medical professionals
does not involve a fundamental constitution [sic] right and, as such, is
tested only by the lesser standard of rational basis."276
On rehearing,277 the Sibley court vacated its earlier decision.s
The main reason for the change was the court's decision to reject
three-tiered scrutiny as a model for state equal protection. "Its rigid-
ity forces courts to begin the decision-making process by pigeon holing
a case in a particular category.... The federal three [tiered] system is
in disarray and has failed to provide a theoretically sound framework
for constitutional adjudication." 279
Finally, the court equated the maximum damage limitations to dis-
crimination on the basis of physical condition, stating that "[t]he law
on its face is designed to impose different burdens on different classes
of people according to the magnitude of damage to their physical con-
dition."280 Because the Louisiana State Constitution forbids discrimi-
nation on the basis of physical condition, the court remanded for a
determination of constitutionality on this basis.
Under a heightened scrutiny test, Graley v. Satayatham 281 struck a
collateral source rule abrogation that applied only to medical malprac-
tice cases. Again, the court related legislative purpose to legislative
271. Id at 298 (quoting Arneson v. Olson, 270 N.W.2d 125, 135-36 (N.D. 1978)).
272. 660 P.2d 829, 190 Cal. Rptr. 371 (1983), rev'd on reh'g, 36 Cal. 3d 359, 683 P.2d 670,
204 Cal. Rptr. 671 (1984).
273. Id. at 838, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 380.
274. Id at 839, 190 Cal. Rptr. at 381.
275. 462 So. 2d 149 (La. 1985), rev'd on reh'g, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
276. Id. at 157.
277. Sibley v. Board of Supervisors, 477 So. 2d 1094 (La. 1985).
278. Id. at 1106-07.
279. Id. at 1108.
280. Id. at 1110.
281. 74 Ohio Op. 2d 316, 343 N.E.2d 832 (C.P. County 1976).
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means. "[A]ssuming a valid legislative purpose to enact laws relating
to the problem of the public's health, this legislation may be counter-
productive.... [Tihe quality of health care may actually decline...
relaxation of standards may occur with the public as the victim."28 2
5. Nebraska Analysis
This analysis must begin with Prendergast v. Nelson.2s3 Prender-
gast was an early challenge to the constitutionality of the 1976 legisla-
tion. The legislation was sustained in a plurality opinion, with three
judges holding the legislation constitutional, three dissenters holding
the legislation unconstitutional, and one justice holding that the par-
ties lacked standing.2s 4 Significantly, the two remaining members of
the Nebraska Supreme Court of 1977 were both dissenters.
The Prendergast plaintiff raised equal protection claims. However,
the classes asserted were: (1) victims of malpractice and (2) other tort
victims. The court held that, for these classes, the Legislature was
"pointing up a crisis in the area of public health and welfare, and using
the police power of the state to effect a solution."285 Further, the
court noted, "we have no reason to question the need for the legisla-
tion.... At the time of enactment of the act in question, there was an
imminent danger that a drastic curtailment in the availability of
health care services could occur in this state."28 6
If Prendergast is overruled on equal protection or due process
grounds, it must be on one of three bases. The right itself may be
elevated, the class may be declared suspect, or the legislative purpose
may be questioned.
In support of elevating the right, it should be noted that if the open
courts clause does not itself render maximum damage limitations un-
constitutional, it nonetheless shows that the right to be made whole
always has been considered important. Further evidence of this
right's importance, inferred from the fact that, since 1913, questions
concerning the extent of negligence have been carefully guarded as
being for the jury only. In the context of contributory negligence, "all
questions of negligence.., and contributory negligence shall be for
the jury."28 7 The motivation apparently was to protect recovery in
cases involving railroad injuries. A parallel section provides that as-
sumption of the risk shall not be a bar if the "railroad company or its
282. Id. at 320, 343 N.E.2d at 837-38.
283. 199 Neb. 97, 225 N.W.2d 657 (1977).
284. The decision is not as close as it appears. Under a unique provision of the Ne-
braska Constitution, a majority of five is required to strike an act of the Legisla-
ture on constitutional grounds. NEB. CONST. art. V, § 2.
285. Prendergast v. Nelson, 199 Neb. 97, 256 N.W.2d 657, 667 (1977).
286. Id. at 114, 256 N.W.2d at 669.
287. NEB. REv. STAT. § 25-21,185 (1985).
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agents, servants or employees have been guilty of negligence." 288 Fi-
nally, since 1867, Nebraska law has held that "[w]henever damages are
recoverable, the plaintiff may claim and recover any rate of damages
to which he may be entitled for the cause of action established."28 9
Whatever else can be said, it is clear that the right to recover dam-
ages has been accorded special protection in Nebraska history. In ad-
dition, those with actual damages of over $1 million and the majority
of those with noneconomic damages of over $250,000 most probably
will be members of a class of disabled citizens. The class itself is rec-
ognized and receives protection under many aspects of Nebraska law.
For example, cities and villages are given the power to define, regu-
late, and suppress discrimination on the basis of disability in the areas
of employment, public accommodation, and housing. When one con-
siders that the statute will prevent individuals who become handi-
capped as the result of a tort from achieving full recovery, an invidious
discrimination may be seen. One source notes that of the 1,642 tort
awards of over $1 million (from a nation of 240 million) which have
ever been awarded, almost two-thirds of the recipients suffered per-
manent paralysis, brain damage, amputations, or death.29 0
If some sort of heightened scrutiny is invoked, the means still must
be tested against the purposes of the legislation. Maximum limits on
damages do not improve the quality of health care, but may in fact
promote the availability of low cost health care by reducing charges to
be passed through to patients. The link is weak, in that there is no
guarantee insurers will lower premiums in response. Further, there is
no guarantee lowered premiums will mean lowered costs to patients.
The requirement of passing through multiple nexus-law to rate, rate
to provider, and provider to public-makes the question a close one
under intermediate scrutiny. The relationship of the collateral source
elimination and modification of joint and several liability is even more
tenuous. However, both of these measures could be viewed as cost
pooling and risk spreading.
If strict scrutiny is invoked, as in White,291 the bulk of the legisla-
tion fails. Whatever the least restrictive means of achieving these
objectives, it is not to shift the burden to the few who are injured.2 92
Finally, as the Prendergast court noted, it had no need to question
288. ME § 25-21,184. The act is questionable as a special law.
289. I& § 18-1725 (1983).
290. Glaberson & Farrell, The Explosion in Liability Lawsuits is Nothing But a Myth,
BusINEss WEEK, Apr. 21, 1986, at 24-25, quoted in Nebraska Ass'n of Trial Att'ys,
The Insurance "Crisis"?: A Nebraska Perspective, at Appendix B.
291. White v. Montana, 203 Mont. 363, 661 P.2d 1272 (1983). See supra notes 263-64 and
accompanying text.
292. The idea of requiring insurers to maintain a high percentage of gains from suc-
cessful investment years in reserve for long periods as a hedge against bad years
comes to mind.
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the necessity of the legislation in 1976. However, this may be untrue
in 1987. The 1976 legislation, and by implication the 1987 legislation,
could be viewed as being premised on a certain set of facts-the exist-
ence of an "insurance crisis" and the withdrawal of providers from the
field. The Court in First Trust Co v. Smith293 judicially noticed the
existence of federal legislation that terminated the "crisis" of farmers
unable to recover the land's value:
[L]egislation expressly by its terms based upon the existence of a definite
emergency therein declared, or other state of facts to uphold it, may never
possess validity if an obvious and vital mistake has occurred in the truth of the
declaration... or may cease to operate if the emergency ceases or the facts
change.2 9 4
Similarly, the legalization of risk pooling among physicians and
hospitals under the Nebraska Hospital and Physicians Mutual Associ-
ation Insurance Act 2 9 5 may have terminated the "insurance crisis." If
this is so, continued discrimination is unnecessary and raises new con-
stitutional issues.
The facts indeed support the conclusion that whatever the situa-
tion was in 1976, no insurance crisis exists in Nebraska today. It is to
these considerations that we now turn.
IV. POLICY ANALYSIS
If there is an "insurance crisis" in Nebraska, it cannot be seen from
looking at the books of insurers. Nebraska's thirty-five liability insur-
ers recorded net earnings of $101.3 million in 1983, $119.9 million in
1984, and $309.3 million in 1985.296 Further, the profits of Nebraska
insurers, from 1976 to 1985, exceeded the national average in all lines
293. 134 Neb. 84, 277 N.W. 762 (1938). See supra notes 141-49 and accompanying text.
294. First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 94-95, 277 N.W. 762, 768 (1938).
295. NEB. REV. STAT. §§ 44-2901 to -2918 (1984).
296. Kelley, No State Crisis is Seen in Liability Insurance, Lincoln Journal-Star, Aug.
10, 1986, at IA, col. 4.
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of insurance.297 For medical malpractice insurance during the same
years, the percentage of return on net worth was over four times the
297. All Lines Property/Casualty Insurance
Operating Rate of Return
Year Earned Premium Profit on Net Worth
1976 $417,000,000 9.1% 23%
1977 $492,000,000 11.2% 27%
1978 $553,000,000 3.9% 13%
1979 $613,000,000 7.0% 20%
1980 $654,000,000 -8.2% -10%
1981 $657,000,000 6.7% 20%
1982 $717,000,000 7.5% 23%
1983 $731,000,000 9.0% 26%
1984 $789,000,000 4.5% 18%
1985 $872,000,000 6.5% 22%
Nebraska Average - 18%
National Average - 11%
Other Liability Insurance
(excluding medical malpractice)
Operating Rate of Return
Year Earned Premium Profit on Net Worth
1976 $31,000,000 12.7% 30%
1977 $41,000,000 24.6% 54%
1978 $51,000,000 16.7% 39%
1979 $54,000,000 14.0% 34%
1980 $50,000,000 26.5% 60%
1981 $46,000,000 15.9% 39%
1982 $40,000,000 13.2% 34%
1983 $44,000,000 8.5% 25%
1984 $49,000,000 0.3% 9%
1985 $70,000,000 -5.0% -1%
Nebraska Average - 32%
National Average - 8%
NATIONAL ASS'N OF INSURANCE COMMISSIONERS, PROFITABILITY BY LINE, BY
STATE quoted in Nebr. Ass'n of Trial Atty's, The Insurance "Crisis"?: A Nebraska
Perspective, ch.2, at 2-3.
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national average.298
The health of Nebraska insurers also can be gauged by examining
the ratio of their surplus to premium risks. While the national aver-
age for insurers was a ratio of 1.9, Nebraska insurers weighed in at a
conservative 2.6. "This means that basically the property and casualty
industry has the capacity to handle most risk situations.... The com-
panies can't seem to decide what special coverage to write."2 99
Moreover, the actual rates paid by Nebraska physicians for mal-
practice insurance are relatively low. For $1 million of coverage, the
typical family practitioner will pay around $2,400 to a primary carrier
and around $1,200 to the state excess pool.3 00 An obstetrician/gy-
nocologist specialist may pay as much as $20,000 to $30,000 to a pri-
mary carrier and $10,000 to $15,000 to the excess pool, and an
anesthesiologist may pay around $6,000 less. The highest figure paid
by a hospital was around $220,000 to a primary carrier and $110,000 to
the state excess fund. 01
The conclusions of a committee formed by the attorney generals of
six states are relevant to the Nebraska situation. Their report ex-
amined four underlying premises of tort reform and found each one to
be inaccurate. The attorney generals found that overall the industry
was not in a poor financial condition, but on the contrary, it was profit-
ing. In addition, they found no drastic increase in the size or number
of liability claims. Finally, they found the crisis was not caused by the
civil justice system and tort reform would not prevent a similar crisis
298. Medical Malpractice Insurance
Operating Rate of Return
Year Earned Premium Profit on Net Worth
1976 $7,000,000 41.2% 87%
1977 $8,000,000 46.9% 99%
1978 $7,000,000 39.9% 85%
1979 $5,000,000 37.4% 71%
1980 $5,000,000 31.5% 70%
1981 $5,000,000 52.1% 111%
1982 $6,000,000 42.0% 92%
1983 $6,000,000 17.7% 43%
1984 $7,000,000 24.6% 58%
1985 $9,000,000 24.9% 59%
Nebraska Average 78%
National Average 19%
Id.
299. Kelly, No State Crisis is Seen in Liability Insurance, Lincoln Journal-Star, Aug.
10,1986, at 4A, col. 2 (statement of Don Deal, property and casualty supervisor for
the Nebraska Insurance Department).
300. Interview, supra note 74.
301. Id.
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from occurring in the future.3 02
Significantly, there is every reason to believe the crisis was as-
serted in something less than good faith. Consumer Reports refers to
the crisis as "manufactured" and "orchestrated." "In June 1985, John
Byrne, then chairman of the board of Geico, a major insurance com-
pany, told the Casualty Actuaries of New York that 'the insurance
companies should quit covering doctors, chemical manufacturers, and
corporate officers ... and let pressure for [tort] reform build in the
courts and the state legislatures.' "o303
The magazine recommended non-insurer risk pooling, tougher
price regulation, and repeal of the McCarran-Ferguson antitrust ex-
emption for insurers.
The insurance industry itself admitted manipulating the availabil-
ity of certain lines for its own purposes. The Insurance Information
Institute asserted one reason many of its members were refusing to
insure nurse-midwives is "they are trying to change the widely held
perception of an insurance crisis to a perception of a lawsuit crisis."304
Another source document, an insurance industry press release,
claimed a $5.5 billion loss in 1985. When challenged by Ralph Nader,
the industry "amended" its figures to show a $1.7 billion gain.305
To the extent an insurance crisis does exist, it is the result of insur-
ance industry price wars, brought about by cycles in interest rates. In-
surance companies have two sources of income-the premium dollar
and the return on investment of the premium dollar. "When interest
rates are high, insurance companies try to gain as many customers as
possible, to bring in the premium dollars they want to invest. In the
early 1980s, when interest rates topped twenty percent, insurance
companies slashed premiums to sell as many policies as they could."306
Various figures within the insurance industry confirm the invest-
ment cycle created the current crisis. For example, Maurice Green-
berg, president of the American International Group, recently stated
that price cutting in the early 1980s "to the point of absurdity" was the
302. National Association of Attorneys General, An Analysis of the Causes of the Cur-
rent Crisis of Unavailability and Unaffordability of Liability Insurance, prepared
by the Nat'l Ass'n of Att'ys Gen., Ad Hoc Comm. on Insurance (chaired by Fran-
cis X. Bellotti, Att'y Gen'l of Mass.) May 1986, noted in Schroeter & Rutzick,
"Tort Reform"-Being an Insurance Company Means Never Having to Say
You're Sorry, 22 GONZ. L. REv. 31, 34 (1986).
303. The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REPS. 544, 545 (1986).
304. Hunter, The Insurance Industry is to Blame, Washington Post, April 13, 1986, at
C7, col. 1, (quoted in Nebr. Ass'n of Trial Atty's, The Insurance "Crisis"?: A Ne-
braska Perspective, at Appendix I).
305. Nebr. Ass'n of Trial Atty's, The Insurance "Crisis"?: A Nebraska Perspective, at
Appendix L.
306. The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REPS. 544 (1986).
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cause of the current crisis.307 "Greenburg told an industry conference
that if insurers had not cut prices but had merely held them constant
there would not be 'all this hullabaloo' about the tort system."308 Sean
Mooney, Senior Vice-President of the Insurance Information Insti-
tute, stated "[t]he fact that premiums are going up at high rates is
purely due to the cycle."309 The cycle can be traced for at least 60
years.310
The Nebraska Department of Insurance provided reasons to be-
lieve the Nebraska "crisis" was the result of poor management by Ne-
braska insurers. "Every six or seven years we have a cycle in which
intense competition among property and casualty insurers results in
rates being set too low to cover claims. The insurers compete by
undercharging."311
At least one state has recognized the true source of the insurance
"crisis" and has enacted appropriate legislation. New York has limited
both upward and downward variations in premiums that may be
charged without prior approval:
The superintendent shall by regulation establish annual limitations upon rate
level increases or decreases which may take effect without prior approval with
respect to a market. The regulation shall be designed to restore and promote
stability in such markets. Upon a determination made that, as to a particular
market, competition is either sufficient to assure that rates will not be exces-
sive or that such market is conducted in a manner not resulting in inadequate
rates, not destructive of competition or detrimental to the solvency of insur-
ers, the superintendent shall exempt such market from the limitations set
forth in such regulation.312
The Act further requires insurers to account for the effects of any
tort reform legislation, requiring the insurer to modify its rate filings
to "reflect the likely reductive cost effects reasonably attributable to
any newly enacted statutory provisions of the civil practice law and
rules, court of claims act and not-for-profit corporation law."313
Again, the solution for the crisis would seem to be more regulation
of insurers. Since the rise in premiums occurs during years when in-
vestments have become less profitable, an additional solution might be
to require that investment profits be retained for a greater period of
307. Hunter, supra note 304.
308. Id.
309. The Manufactured Crisis, 51 CONSUMER REP. 544, 545 (1986).
310. "In cycles that can be traced for 60 years, insurers have cut their premiums when
investment rates are high, to undercut competition. Often rates are set too low to
cover claims. Premiums are then increased when interest rates are high and in-
vestment income is low." Kelly, Expert Says Insurance Industry Needs Reform,
Lincoln Journal-Star, Oct. 10, 1986, at 14, col. 2.
311. Kelly, No State Crisis is Seen in Liability Insurance, Lincoln Journal-Star, Aug.
10, 1986, at 1A, col. 4 (quoting Don Deal, the property and casualty supervisor at
the Nebraska Insurance Department).
312. N.Y. INS. LAw § 2344(b) (McKinney Supp. 1988).
313. Id. § 2344(g)(1).
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time as a hedge against bad years, rather than paid out as dividends as
is the current practice.
V. CONCLUSION
Two events, separate in time and space.
The first is in the future. Susan Von Stetina lives on in a hospital
room in Florida, only partially capable of understanding the true na-
ture of the misfortune that has befallen her. Somewhere, in Ne-
braska, her counterpart walks, alive and uninjured. What can happen
will happen. The injury will occur and a horribly maimed plaintiff
will come forward.
The second event is in the past. It is 1937. To describe the econ-
omy as poor is a gross understatement; it is catastrophic. Land was
worth ruinously low sums, and it had been financed at high sums.
Lenders wanted their money or the land back. Farmers wanted their
homes, their livelihood, and they feared a future of being homeless
and unemployed. The Legislature protected them, staying the foreclo-
sures for several years. The lenders sought relief; the Supreme Court
was pressed to declare the status of the relief law. The question could
not be avoided. The Nebraska Supreme Court gave the only answer
the constitution allowed it to give:
A Constitution is not to be made to mean one thing at one time, and another at
some subsequent time when the circumstances may have changed as perhaps
to make a different rule in the case seem desirable. A principal share of the
benefit expected from written constitutions would be lost if the rules they
established were so flexible as to bend to circumstances or be modified by
public opinion. It is with special reference to the varying moods of public
opinion, and with a view to putting the fundamentals of government beyond
their control, that these instruments are framed .... Those beneficent maxims
of the common law which guard person and property have grown and ex-
panded until they mean vastly more to us than they did to our ancestors....
The necessity for bills of rights in our fundamental laws lies mainly in the
danger that the legislature will be influenced, by temporary excitements and
passions among the people, to adopt oppressive enactments. What a court
must do therefore, is declare the law as written.3 14
"All courts shall be open, and every person, for any injury done
him in his lands, goods, person or reputation, shall have a remedy by
due course of law, and justice administered without denial or
delay."315
The Susan Von Stetina of tomorrow waits at the courthouse door.
David G. Newkirk '87
314. First Trust Co. v. Smith, 134 Neb. 84, 103-04, 277 N.W. 762, 772 (1938).
315. NEB. CONST. art I, § 13.
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